The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breach Litigation: Applying the “Venerable Chestnut of Tort Law” in the Age of the Internet by LaBranche, Nicolas N.
Boston College Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 5 Article 5 
5-25-2021 
The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breach Litigation: Applying 
the “Venerable Chestnut of Tort Law” in the Age of the Internet 
Nicolas N. LaBranche 
Boston College Law School, nicolas.labranche@bc.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr 
 Part of the Internet Law Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nicolas N. LaBranche, The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breach Litigation: Applying the “Venerable 
Chestnut of Tort Law” in the Age of the Internet, 62 B.C. L. Rev. 1665 (2021), 
https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol62/iss5/5 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College 
Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu. 
 
 1665 
THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE & DATA 
BREACH LITIGATION: APPLYING THE 
“VENERABLE CHESTNUT OF TORT LAW”1 
IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 
Abstract: Data controllers and processors are increasingly finding themselves the 
targets of hackers who steal the personal identifiable information (PII) stored in 
their systems and sell it on the dark web. Data subjects, whose PII is exposed in a 
data breach, routinely have been turning to data breach litigation as a means of 
compensation for the damages that they suffer. Routinely, plaintiffs have pleaded 
negligence causes of action against data controllers or processors. A plaintiff’s abil-
ity to overcome procedural hurdles, not the merits of their case, often dictates the 
success or failure of these tort claims. One prominent hurdle is the economic loss 
doctrine (ELD), a rule that restricts tort recovery for purely economic damages. 
The ELD is a ubiquitous doctrine with a variety of applications and paradigms in 
tort law. Data breach litigation, however, does not implicate the doctrine’s policy 
goals of promoting private ordering and preventing unlimited and unforeseeable li-
ability. Instead, this Note argues that the ELD in data breach litigation should be 
more pliable and include a special relationship test that the plaintiffs are presumed 
to satisfy. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over ninety percent of all data ever created has been produced in the past 
two years—the result of 2.5 quintillion bytes of data generated daily.2 This da-
ta boom is a result of many factors such as the growth of internet-connected 
devices, the rise of social media, and the growing demand by data controllers 
and processors3 to accumulate personal identifiable information4 (PII).5 Both 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Nathan A. Sales, Regulating Cyber-security, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 1503, 1535 (2013). 
 2 See Bernard Marr, How Much Data Do We Create Every Day? The Mind-blowing Stats Everyone 
Should Read, FORBES (May 21, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2018/05/21/how-
much-data-do-we-create-every-day-the-mind-blowing-stats-everyone-should-read/#75b56c8460ba 
[https://perma.cc/RV9F-J8XN] (describing the growth of the use of data, and then listing some of the 
reasons for the massive growth of data). 
 3 See Commission Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 33 (EU) (defining data controller and 
processor for the General Data Protection Regulation); Chris Brooks, Data Controller vs. Data Pro-
cessor, DIGIT. GUARDIAN (Aug. 11, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/data-controller-vs-data-
processor-whats-difference [https://perma.cc/GU4T-AGKB] (defining the terms data controller and 
data processor in relation to its use in the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)). 
Both data controllers and processors are terms that came into prominence due to the GDPR. See 
Brooks, supra (referencing that companies that seek to become GDPR compliant must understand 
these two terms). The GDPR provides guidance for the use of these terms. Id. A data controller is a 
legal person, public or private entity that “determines the purposes and means of the processing of 
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public and private entities have committed vast resources to effectively collect 
and process PII to increase efficiency, make better decisions, and provide bet-
ter services.6 Whole sectors of the modern economy—particularly social media 
websites—depend on the aggregation, processing, and selling of PII to main-
tain a viable business model.7 
The PII collected and processed by internet platforms, the government, 
and private businesses ranges from relatively benign information, such as a 
name or email address, to highly sensitive data, such as an individual’s social 
                                                                                                                           
personal data.” Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra, at 33. A data controller controls the extent 
of the use of personal data. See Brooks, supra. Data controllers may give data to third parties to pro-
cess for a variety of reasons. Id. A data processor is person, public or private entity that “processes 
personal data on behalf of the controller.” Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra, at 33. The data 
processor does not own the data, and its use of the data is limited to the scope allowed by the data 
controller. See Brooks, supra. 
 4 Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget on Safe-
guarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies 1 n.1 (May 22, 2007), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/3LXC-JAZJ]. PII 
is a broad term and extends to any information that when combined with other information can be 
linked to a specific individual. See id. (stating that PII includes information such as an individual’s 
mother’s maiden name which when combined with other facts could be traced to that specific individ-
ual). Typical forms of PII include names, biometric data, or social security numbers. Id. 
 5 See Irfan Ahmad, How Much Data Is Generated Every Minute?, SOC. MEDIA TODAY (June 15, 
2018), https://www.socialmediatoday.com/news/how-much-data-is-generated-every-minute-infographic-
1/525692/ [https://perma.cc/BGC9-SX96] (displaying where new data is coming from, and describing 
how much data is produced by prominent social media, internet, and data-based companies); Erik 
Brynjolfsson & Andrew McAfee, The Data Boom Is the Innovation Story of Our Lifetime, THE AT-
LANTIC (Nov. 21, 2011), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2011/11/the-big-data-boom-is-
the-innovation-story-of-our-time/248215/ [https://perma.cc/5GEH-T5CN] (exploring how people use 
data in today’s economy and how private entities are increasingly finding novel ways to use infor-
mation, resulting in a data boom); Tim Keary, A Look at Data Trends for 2019, INFO. AGE (Mar. 26, 
2019), https://www.information-age.com/data-analytics-trends-2019-123481163/ [https://perma.cc/
BR87-7298] (providing indicators that show that industries are increasingly turning to data analytics to 
fuel decision-making and investing significant resources in data analytics); Rise of the Data Analyst—
What’s Behind the Boom, PURDUE UNIV. GLOB., https://www.purdueglobal.edu/blog/information-
technology/rise-of-data-analyst/ [https://perma.cc/9X8H-EF5E] (Jan. 15, 2021) (linking the growth in 
data analytic jobs to the growth of data being generated). 
 6 See Kimberly A. Houser & Debra Sanders, The Use of Big Data Analytics by the IRS: Efficient 
Solution or the End of Privacy as We Know It?, 19 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 817, 818–20 (2017) 
(describing how the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) is increasingly using data to enforce the tax code 
and possible worries that arise from government data collection); Brynjolfsson & McAfee, supra note 
5 (exploring the ways in which private entities are using data to make more informed decisions); 
Keary, supra note 5 (tracking the investment of private companies in data analytics). 
 7 See Kurt Wagner, This Is How Facebook Uses Your Data for Ad Targeting, VOX (Apr. 11, 2018), 
https://www.vox.com/2018/4/11/17177842/facebook-advertising-ads-explained-mark-zuckerberg 
[https://perma.cc/A5ZN-PXG9] (explaining that Facebook—and social media companies generally—
heavily rely on the aggregation of users’ PII, and noting that these social media platforms collect indi-
vidual PII and sell that data to advertisers who through algorithms target individual users who they 
believe would be likely to buy or use a product). 
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security or credit card number.8 Data controllers and processors can use PII in 
a variety of ways, such as designing targeted advertising or creating individual-
ized credit reports.9 These factors combine to make PII extremely valuable to 
the source individual, the data controller or processor who stores the data, and 
to any malicious actors who gain access to it.10 Despite this, many Americans 
are unaware of the true extent PII collection by internet platforms, the govern-
ment, and private businesses.11 
                                                                                                                           
 8 See Memorandum from Clay Johnson III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget on 
Safeguarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information to the Heads 
of Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 (defining PII, and providing common 
examples); What Is a Credit Report and What Does It Include?, EQUIFAX, https://www.equifax.com/
personal/education/credit/report/what-is-a-credit-report-and-what-does-it-include/ [https://perma.cc/
Y9NC-Y5VS] (stating what is included in the average American’s credit report). One common pur-
pose of the aggregation of PII is to create an individual credit report. What Is a Credit Report?, CON-
SUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ask-cfpb/what-is-a-credit-report-en-
309/ [https://perma.cc/J92H-EGNR] (June 8, 2017). A credit report “is a statement that has infor-
mation about your credit activity and current credit situation such as loan paying history and the status 
of your credit accounts.” Id. A credit report can contain an individual’s address, name, birthdate, so-
cial security number, phone number, and the intimate details of their financial life. Id. The breadth of 
data collected can result in significant harm to individuals if someone or something exposes their data. 
See Ron Lieber, Why the Equifax Breach Stings So Bad, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/09/22/your-money/equifax-breach.html [https://perma.cc/42FP-7LLT] (detailing 
the consequences of the Equifax data breach for Americans, including the effects of decades of PII 
being exposed and that many individuals no longer trust the institutions that make up the credit report-
ing system). 
 9 See Brynjolfsson & McAfee, supra note 5 (showing ways in which private entities have used 
the power of data, and providing examples of a variety of industries using data analytics to fuel 
growth and efficiency); Lieber, supra note 8 (describing the process in which PII is aggregated by 
credit card reporting processes then plugged through algorithms or black boxes that then create a 
unique individual credit score, which banks and landlords use as metric to judge the credit worthiness 
of that individual). 
 10 See James Short & Steve Todd, What’s Your Data Worth?, 58 MITSLOAN MGMT. REV. 17, 
17–19 (2017) (exploring the valuation of personal data by businesses, and providing examples of how 
businesses have valued data); Ellen Neveux, Healthcare Data: The New Prize for Hackers, SECURE
LINK, https://www.securelink.com/blog/healthcare-data-new-prize-hackers [https://perma.cc/P53Z-
FEJB] (Nov. 19, 2020) (quantifying the price that hackers can get for certain types of data on the 
black market); The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, but Data, THE ECONOMIST 
(May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-valuable-resource-is-
no-longer-oil-but-data [https://perma.cc/QF4H-UB34] (describing the importance and value of data to 
businesses in the economy). 
 11 See Houser & Sanders, supra note 6, at 819–20 (explaining the ways in which the IRS mines 
social media, phones records, and other public sources to process that data to increase the efficiency of 
tax enforcement); Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, THE ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 
2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-here/
568198/ [https://perma.cc/5CTM-M84H] (declaring that indifference to and ignorance of the extent of 
data collection has ended personal privacy); Natasha Singer, What You Don’t Know About How Face-
book Uses Your Data, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/11/technology/
facebook-privacy-hearings.html [https://perma.cc/7JX4-LYDJ] (describing the process in which social 
media companies can track the off-site internet patterns of individuals). 
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Malicious actors or hackers routinely breach public and private entities 
that store data to harvest and sell PII on the black market.12 When PII is ex-
posed through a breach, victims have struggled to obtain adequate compensa-
tion through government regulatory actions—even though the data controller 
or processor took inadequate precautions to secure their data.13 In response, 
victims of data breaches are frequently turning to the courts to pursue litigation 
against the data controller or processor that has mishandled their PII.14 
Currently, there is no one court-tested theory for litigants, leaving plain-
tiffs to creatively plead numerous causes of action, drawing from statutes, 
torts, and contract law.15 In ninety percent of class actions, however, plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 12 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., 2019 END-OF-YEAR DATA BREACH REPORT 2 (2020), 
https://www.idtheftcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/01/01.28.2020_ITRC_2019-End-of-Year-
Data-Breach-Report_FINAL_Highres-Appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW39-V9WA] (providing a 
general overview of data breaches in 2019); Kira Caban, 2020 Breach Barometer: 41M Patient Rec-
ords Breached as Hacking Incidents Escalate, PROTENUS (Feb. 18, 2020), https://blog.protenus.com/
2020-breach-barometer-41m-patient-records-breached-as-hacking-incidents-escalate [https://perma.
cc/E7E2-RQXP] (detailing that hacking in the healthcare industry increased in 2019). In 2019, data 
breaches across all industries, including within the government, increased by 17% from 2018. IDENTI-
TY THEFT RES. CTR., supra, at 2. Although the total number of records breached decreased, this is 
likely due to the Marriott data breach skewing the numbers for 2018. Id. at 14. The business sector 
recorded the highest number of breaches in both 2018 and 2019. Id. In 2018, industries reported 578 
data breaches, which increased to 644 data breaches in 2019, exposing 18,328,975 records. Id. at 13–
15. The healthcare sector was the second most breached industry. Id. In the healthcare industry, the 
number of breached records tripled between 2018 and 2019, to 41,404,022 records. Caban, supra. In 
2019, the healthcare industry suffered 525 breaches, an increase from the 369 breaches in 2018. IDEN-
TITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra, at 2. It is estimated that on the black market, medical records can be 
sold for around $50 per record. Caban, supra. 
 13 See Recent Case, Cyberlaw—Data Breach Litigation—D.C. Circuit Holds That Heightened 
Risk of Future Injury Can Constitute an Injury in Fact for Article III Standing.—In re U.S. Office of 
Personnel Management Data Security Breach Litigation, 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2019), 133 HARV. L. 
REV. 1095, 1095–96 (2020) (describing the struggles of government employees to get compensation 
for a data breach); Emily Birnbaum & Maggie Miller, Equifax Breach Settlement Sparks Criticism, 
THE HILL (July 22, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/454207-equifax-breach-settlement-
sparks-criticism [https://perma.cc/9Q7V-MTBJ] (explaining that critics viewed the Equifax settlement 
as inadequate); Lily Hay Newman, $700 Million Equifax Fine Is Still Too Little, Too Late, WIRED 
(July 22, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/equifax-fine-not-enough/ [https://perma.cc/M9FK-
Q83D] (arguing that the Equifax data breach settlement was too minor and ineffective to remedy the 
harm suffered). 
 14 See Megan Dowty, Note, Life Is Short. Go to Court: Establishing Article III Standing in Data 
Breach Cases, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 683, 686 (2017) (arguing that data breach victims will constitute 
the “next wave” of class action law suits (quoting CARLTON FIELDS & JORDAN BURT, THE 2015 
CARLTON FIELDS JORDAN BURT CLASS ACTION SURVEY: BEST PRACTICES IN REDUCING COST AND 
MANAGING RISK IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 9 (2015), https://classactionsurvey.com/pdf/2015-
class-action-survey.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YGS-5BNR])); Newman, supra note 13 (arguing that the 
government settlement with Equifax was not enough). 
 15 See JENA VALDETERO ET AL., BRYAN CAVE LEIGHTON PAISNER, DATA BREACH LITIGATION 
REPORT 15 (2019), https://www.bclplaw.com/images/content/1/6/v6/163774/2019-Litigation-Report.
pdf [https://perma.cc/RD7P-LZTB] (describing the creativity of plaintiffs in data breach litigation). 
Typically, plaintiffs will allege as many causes of action as possible in a complaint due to the uncer-
tainty of which will survive even the early stages of litigation. Id. 
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claim common law negligence.16 The success of private lawsuits has routinely 
hinged on the plaintiff’s ability to overcome procedural and common law doc-
trines that courts developed to address a different economic age and are still 
adopting to the unique facts raised by data breach litigation.17 
One of the prominent obstacles that plaintiffs must overcome when alleg-
ing negligence—or other tort-based claims—is the economic loss doctrine 
(ELD).18 The ELD restricts the ability of plaintiffs to bring tort claims when 
the defendants’ alleged tortious conduct inflicts purely economic damages19 
and no harm to person or property.20 Courts struggle with applying the ELD, 
and whether to apply the ELD at all, to data breach litigation.21 Part I of this 
Note explores the ELD’s doctrinal development, the two prevailing paradigms 
that govern the ELD’s application, and provides a general overview of data 
breach litigation.22 Part II discusses the intersection of the ELD and data 
breach litigation through an analysis of how different states have applied their 
                                                                                                                           
 16 Id. at 2 (“Negligence, the most popular legal theory in 2016, remained the primary theory (first 
legal count) in approximately 50% of all class action complaints and was alleged in over 90% of all 
class action complaints during both 2017 and 2018.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 17 See Dowty, supra note 14, at 686 (describing the Article III standing problem that plaintiffs 
have faced in data breach litigation); John A. Fisher, Note, Secure My Data or Pay the Price: Con-
sumer Remedy for the Negligent Enablement of Data Breach, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 215, 229–
39 (2013) (arguing that negligence per se should apply to data breaches, and detailing a plaintiff’s 
struggle with data breaches); Max Meglio, Note, Embracing Insecurity: Harm Reduction Through a 
No-Fault Approach to Consumer Data Breach Litigation, 61 B.C. L. REV. 1223, 1236–41 (2020) 
(examining the issues that plaintiffs have faced in consumer data breach litigation). 
 18 See Catherine M. Sharkey, Can Data Breach Claims Survive the Economic Loss Rule?, 66 
DEPAUL L. REV. 339, 341 (2017) (noting that the economic loss doctrine (ELD) is a formidable ob-
stacle to litigation); Meglio, supra note 17, at 1237–38 (explaining that the ELD is a hurdle for plain-
tiffs in data breach litigation). 
 19 Eileen Silverstein, On Recovery in Tort for Pure Economic Loss, 32 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 
403, 403–08 (1999). Economic harms are damages that manifest on a balance sheet. See id. at 406. 
Professor Eileen Silverstein proposes an example of the negligent maintenance of a transformer box 
that causes a telephone pole to collapse on a factory roof, damaging the roof, hurting some employees, 
and resulting in the factory closing. See id. at 404. The factory owner and injured employees will be 
able to collect personal and property-based damages. See id. The other workers, not hurt by the falling 
pole, will not be able to collect lost wage damages due to the shutdown of the factory. See id. Under a 
traditional ELD analysis, these purely economic damages of the uninjured workers would be barred. 
See id. (describing how the ELD bars damages for purely economic loss). 
 20 Dan B. Dobbs, An Introduction to Non-statutory Economic Loss Claims, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 713, 
713 (2006) (“The stand-alone or ‘pure’ economic loss covered by the economic loss rule refers to 
pecuniary or commercial loss that does not arise from actionable physical, emotional or reputational 
injury to persons or physical injury to property.”); Jeffery L. Goodman et al., A Guide to Understand-
ing the Economic Loss Doctrine, 67 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2019) (“The economic loss doctrine pre-
vents a party who suffers only economic damages from recovering those damages in tort.” (emphasis 
omitted)). 
 21 See infra notes 150–251 and accompanying text (describing applications of the ELD in data 
breach litigation). 
 22 See infra notes 25–149 and accompanying text. 
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ELD in data breach litigation.23 Part III argues that the ELD should not be ap-
plied to data breach litigation, as the economic realities of the internet age do 
not implicate the underlying ELD policy goals of promoting private ordering 
and avoiding unforeseeable plaintiffs.24 
I. THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE, DATA BREACHES & CREDIT CARDS 
The ELD, like most of the common law, was developed in the “[t]he [l]aw 
[o]f [t]he [h]orse,” before the digital economy of today.25 Originally, the ELD 
served two important policy goals: the promotion of private ordering26 and the 
prevention of liability to unforeseeable plaintiffs.27 Despite originating as a 
broad bar on purely economic damages, the ELD is now composed of two par-
adigms, the stranger paradigm and contracting parties paradigm, each with 
unique exceptions.28 These exceptions reflect the reality that the common law 
system embraces flexibility to the unique facts of a case.29 The doctrine’s 
broad application, numerous and often confusing exceptions, and competing 
paradigms often serve as an insurmountable roadblock for plaintiffs pursuing 
tort claims in data breach litigation.30 This Note argues that the venerable poli-
cy goals of private ordering and foreseeability are less practicable in an econ-
omy where the telegram has been replaced by the internet.31 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See infra notes 150–251 and accompanying text. 
 24 See infra notes 252–330 and accompanying text. 
 25 See Lawrence Lessig, Commentary, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 501, 506 (1999) (arguing that courts should adapt common law doctrines to align 
with the policy goals of the internet age). Professor Lawrence Lessig argues that there is an inherent 
difference between the real world and digital world. Id. at 511. The common law doctrines developed 
to fix these real-world problems do not translate to the intangible online world. Id. 
 26 See Jorge L. Contreras, From Private Ordering to Public Law: The Legal Framework Govern-
ing Standards-Essential Patents, 30 HARV. J.L. & TECH. REV. 212, 213 (2017) (noting that the phrase 
“private ordering” generally refers to the ways in which private individuals or entities, free from state 
influence, allocate resources, delineate rights and duties, and resolve disputes through contract or 
other legal means). 
 27 See infra notes 106–108 and accompanying text; see also Danielle Sawaya, Note, Not Just for 
Products Liability: Applying the Economic Loss Rule Beyond Its Origin, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1073, 
1076–78 (2014) (describing the origins of the ELD in product liability cases). 
 28 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344, 348–77 (explaining the two different paradigms that the 
ELD operates in and the exceptions that apply to each). 
 29 See David Corker, How the Flexibility of English Common Law Can Encourage Good Judgement, 
CORKER BINNING BLOG (Nov. 14, 2016), https://www.corkerbinning.com/how-the-flexibility-of-english-
common-law-can-encourage-good-judgment/ [https://perma.cc/9Y2G-9PFQ] (noting broadly the flexi-
bility of the common law system, depending on the facts of a given case). 
 30 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348–66 (illustrating cases in which courts applied the ELD to 
the plaintiff’s claims); Meglio, supra note 17, at 1237–38 (characterizing the ELD as a bar against the 
negligence claims). 
 31 See Lessig, supra note 25, at 502–03 (arguing that the common law should adapt to the digital 
space because it is inherently ill-suited to applications beyond the real world). 
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Part I of this Note provides a history of the ELD, explores the intricacies 
of the competing paradigms that operate within the ELD, and introduces the 
ELD as applied to data breaches and data breach litigation.32 Section A over-
views the ELD’s doctrinal origins under economic principles that are now ill-
suited to the digital age.33 Section B explores the two paradigms that operate 
within the ELD and how they can be outcome-determinative in data breach 
litigation.34 Section C discusses the policy considerations of private ordering and 
foreseeability that serve as the impetus for the doctrine’s development.35 Section 
D illustrates what a data breach is and why data breach litigation raises policy 
goals that butt heads with the policy goals of the ELD.36 Section E details the 
credit card payment system, a commonly litigated data breach situation, and the 
unique issues raised by the web of contracts surrounding credit cards.37 
A. The Development of the Economic Loss Doctrine into Two Paradigms 
The ELD premiered in American jurisprudence in 1879, in Savings Bank 
v. Ward, in which the U.S. Supreme Court barred the tort claims of the plain-
tiff, a land buyer, against the defendant, a lawyer hired by the previous land-
owner, who had wrongly certified that the property his client owned was unen-
cumbered.38 The court concluded that the parties lacked any pre-existing legal 
relationship to create liability for purely economic damages.39 The modern 
ELD originated in 1965, in Seely v. White Motor Co., where the Supreme 
Court of California applied the ELD as a limiting doctrine in a product liability 
case to ensure that a defective product would not subject the defendant, a man-
ufacturer, to a chain of unlimited economic liability.40 Because the ELD ap-
                                                                                                                           
 32 See infra notes 25–149 and accompanying text. 
 33 See infra notes 37–48 and accompanying text. 
 34 See infra notes 49–99 and accompanying text. 
 35 See infra notes 100–118 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 119–138 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 139–149 and accompanying text. 
 38 See 100 U.S. 195, 195–98 (1879) (holding the lack of privity between the parties bared for tort 
liability). In 1879, in Savings Bank v. Ward, the defendant, a lawyer, had been paid by the previous 
landowner of a piece of property to certify that it was unencumbered. Id. at 195. The previous land-
owner, however, had transferred the land. Id. The defendant and plaintiff, the person buying the land, 
never had any communication between one another. Id. The previous landowner used the defendant’s 
certification to obtain a loan from the plaintiff, placing the land as collateral. Id. After the loan had not 
been paid, the plaintiff sought to claim the land but could not. Id. 
 39 See id. at 207 (“Suffice it to say these parties never met, and there was no communication of 
any kind between the defendant and the brokers, or the lenders of the money.”). 
 40 See 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965); Vincent R. Johnson, The Boundary-Line Function of the 
Economic Loss Rule, 66 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 523, 557 n.66 (2009) (explaining that one branch of 
the ELD developed from product liability doctrines); Sawaya, supra note 27, at 1076 & n.5 (describ-
ing the ELD as a doctrine originating in product liability). In 1965, in Seely v. White Motor Co., the 
Supreme Court of California first adopted the ELD as a bar against purely economic claims against 
the defendant, a manufacturer of a defective product. See 403 P.2d at 151 (barring the plaintiffs’ tort 
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plied to bar additional tort claims in Seely, it restricted the plaintiffs, owners of 
a car that the defendant manufactured, to an express warranty claim.41 Alt-
hough the legal relationship between the parties remains relevant today, the 
ELD has evolved into a more ubiquitous doctrine, operating more like a blan-
ket term for the prohibition of economic damages in torts.42 
Under this blanket, there are two unique ways the ELD operates in the 
law: the “stranger paradigm” and the “contracting parties paradigm.”43 The 
first version of the ELD—the stranger paradigm—governs when two parties 
have no pre-existing legal relationship defining the duties owed between 
them.44 The second version—the contracting parties paradigm—governs when 
the parties have a contract governing the rights and duties owed between 
them.45 In certain instances, however, the nature of the relationship between 
the two parties does not fit squarely within either of these paradigms.46 In such 
circumstances, a court must decide whether the level of privity between the 
                                                                                                                           
claims). The plaintiffs in Seely purchased a truck with defective brakes. Id. The truck crashed, and the 
plaintiffs sued the defendant for business losses resulting from their inability to use the truck. Id. at 
150. The court held that the newfound restriction in economic damages barred the plaintiffs’ negli-
gence claims. Id. at 151. The court noted, however, that the plaintiffs could proceed under a theory of 
express warranty. Id. 
 41 See 403 P.2d at 151 (holding that the plaintiff may pursue a cause of action under express war-
ranty). 
 42 See Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46 
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 111, 125–126 (1998) (stating that the law surrounding the ELD is not uniform and 
not well settled); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344 (describing the ELD, not as a singular rule, but as a 
general doctrine that applies somewhat differently in the two different paradigms). 
 43 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344 (defining the two paradigms of the ELD); Catherine M. 
Sharkey, In Search of the Cheapest Cost Avoider: Another View of the Economic Loss Rule, 85 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 1017, 1019–34 (2018). See generally Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715–28 (describing the 
competing policy goals and rules when the parties are strangers or when the parties have a contractual 
relationship). Professor Catherine M. Sharkey was the originator of the terms “stranger paradigm” and 
“contracting parties paradigm.” See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344. Since the initial incarnation of 
these terms, Professor Sharkey has broadened the categories and expanded the contracting parties 
paradigm to the consensual paradigm. Sharkey, supra, at 1029–34. Under this approach, the consen-
sual paradigm includes both instances in which a party is in direct privity and the product liability 
ELD. See id. (explaining the consensual parties paradigm). For the purposes of this Note, the contract-
ing parties paradigm is the more appropriate nomenclature, as product liability does not apply to data 
breach litigation. See In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Costumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 
475–76 (D. Md. 2020) (stating that data breach litigation is different from product liability litigation 
because the product that the consumer receives in return for their data is not defective). 
 44 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348 (“The ‘stranger economic loss rule’ posits that, as between 
parties with no contractual or special relationship, there is no duty to avoid negligent infliction of 
purely financial losses.” (quoting Dobbs, supra note 20, 715)); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1019–34 
(describing the two paradigms and their operation in the law). 
 45 Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344–45 (stating that the contracting parties paradigm is implicated 
when the parties have previously allocated the risks and responsibilities of each party, typically 
through contract). 
 46 See id. at 366 (describing data breach litigation as a common example in which the facts of the 
case fit squarely within neither of the two paradigms). See generally Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715–28 
(explaining issues that arise between subcontractors and contractors on construction projects). 
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parties implicates either the contracting parties paradigm or the stranger para-
digm.47 How the court resolves this third-party problem may determine if the 
ELD applies, thus potentially barring the tort claims of the plaintiff.48 
B. The Paradigms: One Rule, or Two Rules, or Three Rules 
The varying applications of the ELD—and their focus on the legal rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant—is necessary to analyze their ap-
plication in data breach litigation, as the paradigm the court places the plaintiff 
and defendant in will implicate one of two generally accepted exceptions to the 
rule.49 Subsection 1 of this Section explores the stranger paradigm—when no 
pre-existing legal or contractual relationship exists—which illustrates the 
ELD’s policy goal of protecting defendants from unforeseeable plaintiffs.50 
Subsection 2 discusses the contracting parties paradigm—when a pre-existing 
legal relationship exists—which highlights the ELD’s encouragement of pri-
vate ordering between parties.51 Subsection 3 explains the third-party problem, 
how courts have traditionally approached it, and why it persists as a tricky ana-
lytical issue in each case.52 
1. The Stranger Paradigm: When Two Strangers Walk into a Courtroom 
The stranger paradigm applies when there is no pre-existing contractual 
or legal relationship between parties.53 Under the stranger paradigm, when one 
stranger sues another for economic damages, the ELD typically bars the plain-
                                                                                                                           
 47 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 813–16 (7th Cir. 2018) (de-
ciding in a data breach litigation case whether the facts of the payment credit card system more accu-
rately reflected a stranger paradigm or a contracting parties paradigm); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366 
(explaining that in the third-party problem, the facts of the case fit neatly within either paradigm). 
 48 See Jay M. Fienman, The Economic Loss Rule and Private Ordering, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 813, 
815 (2006) (stating that the third-party problem involves a network of contracts); Sharkey, supra note 
18, at 366 (noting that, depending on the availability of ELD exceptions, a jurisdiction’s choice of 
paradigm may be outcome-determinative); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1034 (explaining how and why 
choice of paradigm is key). Compare Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 813–16 (adopting explicitly 
the contracting parties paradigm in a third-party problem, and then applying the ELD to bar the negli-
gence claims of the defendant), with In re Arby’s Rest. Grp. Inc. Litig., C.A. No. 17-cv-0514, 2018 
WL 2128441, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018) (adopting implicitly the stranger paradigm in a third-
party problem, and then not applying the ELD to bar the negligence claims of the plaintiff). 
 49 See infra notes 53–251 and accompanying text (describing the ELD and how the ELD operates 
in data breach litigation). 
 50 See infra notes 53–70 and accompanying text. 
 51 See infra notes 71–87 and accompanying text. 
 52 See infra notes 88–99 and accompanying text. 
 53 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348 (describing the stranger paradigm as one where there is no 
pre-existing contractual or special relationship between the parties that could subject the defendant to 
tort liability for economic damages). 
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tiff’s tort claims.54 Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted exceptions to 
the ELD when operating in the stranger paradigm that reflect the existence of a 
common law independent duty between the two parties.55 
a. Flat Bar: When the Stranger Paradigm Bars Purely Economic Claims 
The traditional—and more rigid—approach to the ELD in the stranger 
paradigm creates an absolute bar to tort claims for purely economic damages 
when the plaintiff and defendant have no pre-existing legal relationship.56 The 
2001 case 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc. 
exemplifies this approach; the New York Court of Appeals applied the ELD 
between two parties with no pre-existing legal relationship.57 In 532 Madison 
Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc., one of the defendants, a construction company, 
had negligently caused the partial collapse of the side of a thirty-nine-story 
building.58 To repair the fallout of the collapse, fifteen city streets and side 
streets were temporarily closed.59 In response, the key plaintiff, a local deli, 
that suffered no property or personal damages, but rather only lost profits un-
der the street closure, attempted to sue the defendant for economic damages 
originating from their alleged negligence.60 The court—in dismissing the 
plaintiff’s case—concluded that the plaintiff’s economic loss existed outside 
the scope of any duty owed by the defendant.61 In support of its decision, the 
court stated that extending such a duty would expose the defendant to exten-
sive, possibly unlimited, liability.62 Ultimately, because the defendant had no 
                                                                                                                           
 54 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (“[A] defendant owes no duty to exercise reasonable care for 
the pure stand-alone economic interests of strangers—that is to persons with whom the defendant has 
no relationship by contract, undertaking, or specific legal obligation.”); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348 
(discussing the ELD implementation when strangers sue one another). 
 55 See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 
85, 88–89 (S.C. 1995) (holding that regardless of the two parties not having a pre-existing legal rela-
tionship, an independent duty exception to the stranger paradigm allowed the claims to proceed). See 
generally Sharkey, supra note 18, at 354–60 (describing all the exceptions courts have applied to the 
ELD when operating in the stranger paradigm). 
 56 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 354–60 (explaining the stranger paradigm and the exceptions 
commonly applied to the ELD within that paradigm). 
 57 See 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1101 (N.Y. 2001) (stating that the plaintiffs could not bring purely eco-
nomic damages against the defendants for their negligent actions). 
 58 Id. at 1099. In 2001, in 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Center, Inc., the 
New York Court of Appeals explained that the collapse occurred at a construction site located in the 
commercial district of New York City. Id. Brick, mortar, and other construction materials fell into the 
streets below and put ninety-four holes in the building’s south wall. Id. The fallout of the collapse shut 
down the surrounding area for approximately two weeks. Id. 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. The chief plaintiff in this case represented a local deli that had to be shut down for five 
weeks as a direct result of the collapse. Id. 
 61 See id. at 1103 (holding that there was no legal duty that could allow for economic damages). 
 62 Id. The court listed all the parties that could potentially sue the defendants, which included the 
construction company, the building owner, and others, if it allowed economic damages in this in-
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pre-existing legal relationship or duty owed to the plaintiff, the ELD applied, 
barring any tort claims for economic damages.63 This inflexible manifestation 
of the stranger paradigm is the dominant application of the ELD when the par-
ties have no pre-existing legal relationship.64 
b. The Independent Duty Exception: When the Stranger Paradigm Allows 
Purely Economic Damages 
Some jurisdictions, however, have adopted an “independent duty excep-
tion” to the ELD when operating within the stranger paradigm.65 Under this 
exception, when the plaintiff can demonstrate that the defendant owed them a 
non-contractual independent duty of care, existing in the common law, then the 
ELD will not per se bar the plaintiff’s tort claims.66 In 1995, in Tommy L. Grif-
fin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., the Supreme 
Court of South Carolina held that the ELD did not bar the plaintiff’s negli-
gence claims asserting purely economic damages, as an independent duty of 
the defendant.67 The court, operating within the stranger paradigm, held that 
the ELD does not apply when a “duty arising independently of any contract 
duties” exists.68 The defendant—an engineer who had designed and supervised 
                                                                                                                           
stance. Id. The court noted that every actor who relied on the street for anything of economic value 
would be then permitted to sue the defendants. See id. (detailing the potential extent of parties that 
could claim economic damages). 
 63 See id. (holding broadly that the lack of legal relationship made the ELD applicable, thus bar-
ring the claims). 
 64 See generally Sharkey, supra note 18, at 354–60 (noting how courts often apply the ELD as a 
broad prohibition to recovery for economic damages). 
 65 See In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019) (holding that there did exist an independent duty exception to the ELD); Dittman v. UPMC, 
196 A.3d 1036, 1056 (Pa. 2018) (same); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones 
& Goulding, Inc., 463 S.E.2d 85, 88–89 (S.C. 1995) (relying on an independent duty exception to the 
ELD, thus not barring the claims); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 354–55 (describing the independent 
duty exception to the ELD). 
 66 See In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (describing the exception as allowing for eco-
nomic damages when the plaintiff can show a pre-existing duty); Dittman,196 A.3d at 1056 (stating 
that the ELD did not apply when an independent duty of care applied); Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & 
Heating Co., 463 S.E.2d at 88–89 (stating that because the defendant owed the plaintiff an independ-
ent duty, the plaintiff could pursue economic damages); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 354–55 (explain-
ing that the independent duty exceptions allows for economic damages). 
 67 See 463 S.E.2d at 86–88 (“A breach of a duty arising independently of any contract duties 
between the parties, however, may support a tort action.”). 
 68 See id. at 88 (stating that there was no privity of contract between the parties, which resulted in 
an implicit adoption of the stranger paradigm). The 1995 case Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating 
Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc. represents a third-party problem in which the Supreme Court of 
South Carolina implicated a stranger paradigm by stating that no direct privity existed. See Sharkey, 
supra note 18, at 345 n.17 (explaining the general third-party problem). Compare Tommy L. Griffin 
Plumbing & Heating Co., 463 S.E.2d at 86–88 (explaining that the parties were in a construction 
project and both had contracts with the same general contractor), with BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, 
Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 74 (Colo. 2004) (stating that because the parties were in an entanglement of con-
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a construction project—owed an ongoing independent duty to the plaintiff, a 
contractor, to competently design and manage the project.69 Because the plain-
tiff and defendant’s relationship implicated its own independent duty of care, 
manifested from the common law, the ELD did not apply, and the plaintiff 
could proceed with the merits of its tort claims.70 
2. The Contracting Parties Paradigm: When Courts Allow and Do Not 
Allow for Economic Damages Between Contracting Parties 
The other main ELD paradigm—the contracting parties paradigm—is im-
plicated when two parties have a pre-existing contract that governs the rights 
and duties owed between them and relates to the claims asserted against the 
defendant.71 This paradigm is commonly implicated when the parties are both 
businesses or involved in a business transaction that requires a contract.72 
Courts in this paradigm attempt to ensure that the boundary between tort and 
contract law is maintained by restricting recovery to the contract terms agreed 
to by the parties, or under contract law more generally.73 The principle policy 
                                                                                                                           
tracts, the case involved a third-party problem in which the parties’ relationship should be governed 
by the contracts). Generally, construction projects and the network of contracts that spring from them 
present model third-party problems. Sharkey, supra note 18, at 345 n.17. Courts apply the ELD in 
such instances holding that contracts govern the relationships of the parties, thus implicating the con-
tracting parties paradigm. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d at 74 (holding that the relationship should be 
governed by the terms of the contracts); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 345 (explaining how courts gener-
ally apply the ELD in construction projects). Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. represents 
how a court can apply the ELD to near identical facts in a different jurisdiction and come out with 
inconsistent results as compared to the majority approach. See 463 S.E.2d at 86–88 (holding that no 
contractual privity or relationship existed between the parties); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 345 (noting 
the majority approach to the third-party problem in construction projects). 
 69 See Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co., 463 S.E.2d at 89 (“Under these facts, Engineer 
owed a duty to the contractor not to negligently design or negligently supervise the project.”). 
 70 See id. (holding that the ELD did not apply because the plaintiff had shown that an independent 
duty existed). 
 71 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 723 (detailing when the contracting parties rule applies under the 
ELD); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 361–66 (explaining that the contracting parties paradigm is impli-
cated when there exists some contractual relationship). 
 72 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 361–66 (explaining that a contractual relationship implicates the 
contracting parties paradigm); see also, e.g., Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 
F. App’x 849, 852 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (applying the contracting parties paradigm when both 
parties were businesses). 
 73 See, e.g., Silverpop Sys., Inc., 641 F. App’x at 854 (holding that the ELD applied, as the two 
parties had a contract governing their relationship); In re Sony Gaming Networks & Consumer Data 
Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 819–20 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (concluding that the ELD applied, 
and noting that a contract between the two parties existed); Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, 
779 A.2d 67, 69 (Vt. 2001) (holding that the existence of a contract precluded tort liability for strictly 
economic damages); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 361–66 (explaining that when operating within the 
contracting parties paradigm, courts generally apply the ELD to bar claims). Contra Portier v. NEO 
Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (noting that 
despite the existence of a contract, the California ELD did not bar the tort claims of the plaintiffs). 
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rationales in this paradigm are to respect contracts and to encourage private 
ordering more broadly.74 
a. The Contracting Parties Paradigm: When the Economic Loss Doctrine 
Bars Claims 
The typical application of the ELD within the contracting parties para-
digm bars all tort claims, and restricts recovery to the contract and contract 
law.75 For example, in 2001, in Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, the 
Vermont Supreme Court concluded that the ELD applied, and it thus barred 
tort claims, citing the existence of a contract with the defendants.76 This con-
tract governed the legal duties that the defendants owed to the plaintiffs regard-
ing the management of a trust pool.77 The enumeration of these duties in con-
tract caused the court to implicitly adopt a contracting parties paradigm.78 The 
court—expressing caution—held that the defendants’ negligence amounted 
only to a breach of contract, and thus applied the ELD because the plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Fienman, supra note 48, at 969 (explaining the ELD’s policy goal of promoting private 
ordering by contract). 
 75 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 361–66 (noting how courts will commonly apply the ELD in the 
contracting parties paradigm because the contract governs the rights and duties owed between the two 
parties). 
 76 See 779 A.2d at 71 (holding that the ELD applied and that the plaintiffs could obtain remedies 
under contract law). In 2001, in Springfield Hydroelectric Co. v. Copp, the Vermont Supreme Court 
considered the special relationship exception to the ELD in the contracting parties paradigm. Id. The 
court, however, did not offer much analysis on the issue. See id. (briefly discussing the special rela-
tionship, and concluding it did not apply without further rationale). The court noted that when a con-
tract defines duties, courts rarely allow for damages existing outside of contract law, or even beyond 
the contract itself. See id. (noting broadly that contracting principles better govern the relationship). 
 77 Id at 69. The plaintiffs in Springfield Hydroelectric Co. were owners of small hydroelectric 
power facilities. Id. The defendants were former employees of Vermont Power Exchange, a purchas-
ing agent for Vermont’s Public Service Board. Id. The plaintiffs collectively had entered into a “pow-
er purchase agreement” with the defendants to facilitate the sale of energy. Id. The general agreement 
established a trust fund that would serve as a safety net for producers who had to shut down before 
satisfying the terms of their agreement. Id. Upon successful completion of a thirty-year sale agree-
ment, the hydroelectric producer would receive repayment of the money that they contributed to the 
trust pool. Id. The defendants were in charge of managing the trust fund; however, Vermont’s Public 
Service Board was solely allowed to distribute the trust fund to struggling producers. Id. In 1988, the 
defendants approved a new hydroelectric facility to go online. Id. One year later, in 1989, that produc-
er defaulted and received payment from the trust pool of $161,144. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the 
defendants had negligently allowed the producer to go online, causing them economic damages in the 
form of reduced value of the trust fund. Id. 
 78 See id. at 70 (stating that contracting principles more accurately governed the relationship be-
tween the parties in the case); see also Sharkey, supra note 18, at 361–66 (stating that when a contract 
governs the allocation of risks, rights, and damages between the parties, it implicates the contracting 
parties paradigm). 
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only suffered economic damages.79 Thus, the plaintiffs could only obtain dam-
ages specified within the contract.80 
b. A Special Duty: When the Contracting Parties Paradigm Does Not Bar 
Claims 
Certain jurisdictions, however, obfuscate the distinction between tort and 
contract law by allowing a “special duty” or “special relationship” exception to 
the ELD.81 Jurisdictions adopting this approach allow tort claims for economic 
damages when the plaintiff can prove that there exists a special relationship 
between the parties.82 The special relationship exception operates as a higher 
standard of proof for plaintiffs than the independent duty exception.83 
In 1979, in J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, the Supreme Court of California de-
tailed a framework for determining whether a special relationship existed.84 
The court outlined six factors: (1) the extent to which the defendant intended to 
affect the plaintiff with their actions, (2) the foreseeability of the harm, (3) the 
degree of certainty of the plaintiff’s injury, (4) the closeness of the nexus be-
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Springfield Hydroelectric Co., 779 A.2d at 71 (“We have been careful to maintain a divid-
ing line between contract and tort theories of recovery.”). 
 80 See id. at 71–72 (stating that courts should maintain the barrier between tort and contract, and 
concluding that the ELD applied). 
 81 See Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *16–22 (D. Mass. 
Dec. 31, 2019) (stating that despite the existence of a contract between the parties, the ELD did not 
bar tort claims for purely economic damages by the defendants because a special relationship excep-
tion applied); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 365–66 (explaining the special relationship exception to the 
contracting parties paradigm). Some courts have adopted the independent duty exception when adopt-
ing exceptions to the ELD in the contracting parties paradigm. Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 
1054 (Pa. 2018) (“[I]f the duty arises independently of any contractual duties between the parties, then 
a breach of that duty may support a tort action.”). 
 82 See Portier, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (applying the special relationship test, and finding 
that the ELD did not bar the tort claims of the plaintiffs against the defendants in data breach litiga-
tion). But see In re Sony Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 
942, 966–74 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that because a special relationship was not satisfied, the plain-
tiffs were restricted to a remedy under contract law). 
 83 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366 (stating the special relationship test is a higher threshold); 
see also Enslin v. Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 672 (E.D. Pa. 2015) (holding that the special 
relationship exception should only be implicated when a great imbalance of power exists), aff’d, 739 
739 F. App’x 91 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 84 See 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (detailing a six-factor test to determine whether a special rela-
tionship exists between the parties, which would not bar a tort claim by the plaintiff). In 1979, in 
J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, the Supreme Court of California explained that the plaintiff operated a res-
taurant at the county airport. Id. at 62. The defendant was a contractor hired by the county and tasked 
with repairing the heating and cooling system of the airport. Id. The defendant failed to complete the 
work in the reasonable time as defined in the contract. Id. The plaintiff could not operate their restau-
rant during the construction of the heating and cooling system, suffering economic losses. Id. The 
plaintiff then sued for negligent performance of a contract—despite having no contractual privity. Id. 
Although this was not a traditional economic loss case in the contracting paradigm, it highlights what 
exactly a special relationship is. Id. 
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tween the defendant’s actions and the plaintiff’s injury, (5) the moral blame of 
the defendant’s conduct, and (6) an overall objective of preventing future harm.85 
A court should consider these factors holistically in determining whether a spe-
cial relationship exists.86 When the collective weight of the six factors leads to 
an affirmative finding of a special relationship, the ELD will not apply, allowing 
tort claims to proceed.87 
3. The Third-Party Problem: The Grey Area Between the Two Paradigms 
When case facts fail to match either the contracting parties paradigm or 
the stranger paradigm, the third-party problem arises.88 Typically, the “third-
party problem” occurs when the two parties lack a direct contractual relation-
ship, but are bound by an entanglement of contracts with a common third-
party.89 The parties have some privity due to mutual contractual relationships 
with a mutual party; however, there is no direct agreement governing the rela-
tionship between the plaintiff and defendant.90 A court must decide either that 
the multiple contracts create contractual privity between the parties—implicating 
the contracting parties paradigm—or that the entanglement of contracts does not 
amount to direct privity—implicating the stranger paradigm.91 The court’s char-
acterization of the privity level of the parties can be essentially outcome-
determinative as to whether tort claims may proceed, as the exception in the con-
tracting parties paradigm creates a higher burden of proof for plaintiffs.92 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Id. at 63. 
 86 See id. (examining the six factors that courts review holistically to determine whether a special 
relationship existed between the two parties). 
 87 See id. (finding that because the plaintiff was able to show that the six factors have been met 
the ELD does not bar the claims due to the existence of a contract); Portier, 2019 WL 7946103, at 
*17–22 (holding that the six factors had been satisfied by the plaintiffs, so ELD did not bar their neg-
ligent claim for economic damages). 
 88 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 726 (illustrating issues with the ELD between a subcontractor, con-
tractor, and designer); Fienman, supra note 48, at 815 (describing the third-party problem); Sharkey, 
supra note 18, at 366 (explaining that third-party problems do not fit squarely within either of the two 
paradigms). 
 89 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 813–15 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(holding that if the facts of a case fit squarely within neither of the two paradigms, a court must de-
termine which to apply); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366 (stating courts must decide which paradigm 
to operate in). 
 90 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 821 (arguing that the parties were loosely bound in a 
“web of contracts” with one another); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 362 (explaining that courts may find 
the parties in situations where de facto privity exists). 
 91 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 821 (stating that the facts of the case created a contract-
ing parties paradigm); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366 (describing that courts must pick which para-
digm to adopt in a third-party problem). 
 92 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 821 (adopting the contracting parties paradigm, which 
precludes tort liability); Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 850–51 
(11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (stating that because the parties had a contract governing the duties 
owed between the two parties, the independent duty exception should not apply); Sharkey, supra note 
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The third-party problem frequently arises regarding negligence claims be-
tween a subcontractor, a general contractor, and the contracting party.93 For in-
stance, in 2004, in BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., the Colorado Supreme 
Court held that the ELD barred claims by the plaintiff, a steel subcontractor, 
against the defendants, the original designers and inspectors of a construction 
project.94 The plaintiff and defendants had no direct privity, only indirect privity 
through mutual contracts with an intermediary general contractor.95 The plaintiff 
alleged that the defendants had negligently caused them economic damages.96 
The court reasoned that the plaintiff—by entering into a network of contracts—
was bound by the rights and duties enumerated in the original general contrac-
tor’s contract.97 The court noted that the contract governed the duty to reasona-
bly design the project and established the applicable standard of care; therefore, 
the court concluded that the plaintiff’s remedies must be rooted in the contract.98 
Accordingly, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence claims, and restricted 
the plaintiff’s recovery to claims originating under contract law.99 
C. Policy: How the Economic Loss Doctrine Promotes Private  
Ordering and Ensures That the Plaintiff Is Foreseeable 
The contracting parties and stranger paradigms’ reliance on the relation-
ship between the parties reflects the unique policy goals that rationalize their 
                                                                                                                           
18, at 366 (arguing an adoption of a paradigm could skew the probability of success for the plaintiff, 
especially if the courts allow for an exception in the stranger paradigm). 
 93 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 815 (explaining that the relationship between the plain-
tiffs and defendant was analogous to the relationship between a contractor and subcontractor); BRW, 
Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., 99 P.3d 66, 74 (Colo. 2004) (holding that by entering into a “network of 
interrelated of contracts,” the plaintiff, a subcontractor, could not sue under a cause of action outside 
of the contract); Dobbs, supra note 20, at 723 (stating that the third-party problem arises surrounding 
the series of contracts commonly found in construction projects). 
 94 99 P.3d at 68–71. In in 2004, in BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc., the Colorado Supreme 
Court, explained that the City of Denver had contracted with one of the defendants, the engineering 
firm BRW, Inc., to design two steel bridges. Id. at 68. The defendant submitted the design of the two 
bridges to Denver, which then solicited construction bids. Id. Edward Kramer & Sons won the bid, 
and then hired Anko Metal Services to conduct a variety of services related to the steel needed for the 
bridge. Id. Anko Metals Services then hired the plaintiff. Id. The defendant then hired co-defendant 
Professional Service Industries, Inc. to supervise the construction project. Id. at 70. The contract that 
the plaintiff agreed to contained specific provisions that required the plaintiff to follow the plans of the 
defendant. Id. at 69. 
 95 Id. at 68. The only relevant party the plaintiff had direct privity with was Anko Metals Ser-
vices, who was still two steps removed from BRW, Inc. Id. (describing the contractual web). 
 96 Id. The plaintiff alleged that BRW, Inc.’s plans had failed to account for the local climate, 
resulting in undue delays. Id. at 70. 
 97 See id. at 73 (finding that the original contract stated the allegedly breached duty, and noting it 
thus governed any ensuing claims). 
 98 See id. 
 99 See id. at 74 (dismissing the negligence claims of the plaintiff due to the ELD). 
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existence.100 The contracting parties paradigm is concerned with the contractu-
al relationship between the plaintiff and defendant, with the goal of promoting 
private ordering.101 Likewise, the focus on the non-existence of any legal rela-
tionship in the stranger paradigm stems from the policy rationale to prevent 
unforeseeable and the potentially unlimited liability that purely economic 
damages can cause.102 
First, private ordering—the policy goal underpinning the contracting par-
ties paradigm—is deeply rooted in contract law and reflects a fundamental de-
sire to let individuals freely establish duties and damages between themselves 
through contract instead of tort.103 Proponents of private ordering assert that 
economic actors are better allocators of their own risks and benefits than the 
courts through enforcement of tort liability; thus, the ELD should strictly bar 
tort damages when the parties have allocated risk through contract.104 In this 
sense, the ELD has a “bargain-forcing function[]” that promotes private con-
tracting by restricting the potential for tort recovery.105 Further, when two par-
ties have privity, the ELD serves as a “boundary-line” between tort and con-
tract law, preventing contract law from “drown[ing] in a sea of tort.”106 This 
theory operates soundly in product liability litigation, where a contractual rem-
edy is typically readily available, either through a warranty or the Uniform 
                                                                                                                           
 100 See Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1019–34 (explaining the general policy justifications for the 
ELD under the two paradigms). See generally Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715–28 (explaining the broad 
justifications for the ELD); Fienman, supra note 48, at 814 (discussing the ELD in the context of 
private ordering). 
 101 See generally Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715–28 (listing overarching policy rationales for the 
ELD); Fienman, supra note 48, at 814 (providing background on the ELD and private ordering). 
 102 See Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1019–1034 (describing some general policy rationales for the 
ELD). 
 103 Johnson, supra note 40, at 546–47 (stating that private ordering was an impetus in the adop-
tion of the ELD); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1033. 
 104 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 714 (offering that where a contract exists, its terms shall be re-
spected); Fienman, supra note 48, at 814 (noting the policy rationale behind private ordering); John-
son, supra note 40, at 546–47 (explaining private ordering); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1034 (restating 
that in the contract parties paradigm, a default no-tort-liability rule applies). If the contract terms, 
risks, and provisions are all valid, then the court should not seek to impose anything further than what 
the parties agreed to and should “[s]imply honor the contract itself.” Dobbs, supra note 20, at 714. 
 105 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 547–48 (“[T]he economic loss rule performs critical bargain-
forcing functions.”). By eliminating the possibility of tort recovery, the ELD allows parties to reada-
bly allocate damages for non-compliance. Id. The certainty of contractually enumerated damages 
promotes the efficient allocation of resources, and it provides assuredness for businesses’ economic 
calculations. Id. Allowing tort damages would only increase transaction costs by fostering uncertainty 
in potential liability and reducing the strength of bargained-for contractual terms. Id. 
 106 See E. River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 866 (1986) (stating that 
the ELD sets a border between two types of law). The ELD protects the line by ensuring that, when 
both contract and tort theories apply, there is no overlap. See Sawaya, supra note 27, at 1087–90 (ex-
plaining the “boundary-line” function of the rule). 
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Commercial Code.107 In less traditional fields, such as data breach litigation, 
doubts have been raised over the efficacy of private ordering.108 This is primar-
ily due to data-related contracts’ reliance on contracts of adhesion, with inher-
ent bargaining power imbalances between individual consumers and multina-
tional corporations.109 
Secondly, the ELD embodies a concern—underlying the stranger para-
digm—that purely economic damages expose parties to unforeseeable and un-
limited liability.110 Under the stranger paradigm, where the parties have no pre-
existing legal relationship, the ELD attempts to limit damages that exist out-
side the bounds of foreseeability.111 Although it may be foreseeable to a negli-
gent driver that they may damage the delivery truck next to them, it is not as 
foreseeable that the craftsman—relying on the truck’s delivery of wood—may 
suffer economic damages to their business following an accident.112 In 1985, 
as the Pennsylvania Superior Court in Aikens v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad 
                                                                                                                           
 107 Johnson, supra note 40, at 551. In today’s highly commercialized society, in most transac-
tions, there will be a contractual remedy available. Id. For instance, if an individual buys paint that 
does not stick to the wall, then that individual will have claims under contract through the paint’s 
warranty. Id. The Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) supports this. Id. The UCC provides a breadth of 
options for consumers to seek claims resulting from a defective product. Id. 
 108 See Emily Frye, The Tragedy of the Cybercommons, 58 BUS. LAW. 349, 367 (2002); Sales, 
supra note 1, at 1535 (describing the issues with private ordering in the internet economy). Typically, 
the warranties that provide a remedy for most consumers are not available in the cybersecurity indus-
try. Frye, supra, at 367; Sales, supra note 1, at 1534. Software companies generally operating under a 
licensing system does not provide the same recourse for injured parties with defective products in 
traditional cases. Frye, supra, at 367; Sales, supra note 1, at 1534. 
 109 See Frye, supra note 108, at 367 (explaining the issues that private parties encounter when 
contracting in the digital economy); Sales, supra note 1, at 1535 (illustrating private ordering can be 
ineffective due to the high transaction costs). 
 110 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (stating some of the rationales underlying the paradigm); 
Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1022–29 (justifying the stranger paradigm). There is further justification 
for the stranger paradigm under a more theoretical approach. Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1022–24. The 
theoretical approach posits that society puts greater value on property and persons than on economic 
damages. See id. 
 111 See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 
(N.Y. 2001) (fearing that implementation of liability would unleash a chain of liability to all parties 
who have suffered even minor harm); Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (describing the policy goals of the 
stranger paradigm). Theoretically, economic loss can be an endless chain. Dobbs, supra note 20, at 
715. For instance, individual A acts negligently resulting in economic damage to individual B. Id. As 
a result, individual B does not make their credit card payment to the bank. Id. The bank, as a result, 
has to increase the interest rate on their credit card to be able to cover for the losses of individual B’s 
non-payment. Id. This then could result in another bank customer cutting back on the amount of 
cheeseburgers they buy from a local burger joint—that would then also suffer economic harm. Id. 
This hypothetical illustrates the potential chain that could be unleashed. Id. The ELD serves a vital 
function to curtail and place a limit on the liability that an individual can face from their negligent 
behavior. Id. 
 112 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 713 (illustrating an example of the stranger rule). This hypothet-
ical’s facts were adopted from the 2000 case Aikens v. Debow. See generally 541 S.E.2d 576 (W. Va. 
2000). 
2021] The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breaches 1683 
Co. noted, “To allow a cause of action for negligent cause of purely economic 
loss would be to open the door to every person in the economic chain of the 
negligent person or business to bring a cause of action.”113 
Courts developed the ELD to foster predictability and efficiency in eco-
nomic relationships.114 They founded the doctrine upon two core assump-
tions.115 First, that parties to a contract can reasonably negotiate for the rights 
and duties delineated in that contract.116 Second, that it is not foreseeable who 
may suffer economic damages from a defendant’s negligent conduct.117 As 
economic transactions have changed in the digital age, serious doubts have 
been raised as to the validity of these assumptions, specifically in the context 
of data breach litigation.118 
D. The State of Cybersecurity and Data Breach Litigation 
A data breach, and any subsequent litigation, undercuts the ELD’s core 
assumptions by removing the issue of foreseeability and challenging the feasi-
bility of private ordering.119 A data breach occurs when data stored on a data 
controller or processor’s server is accessed without approval or exposed to a 
third party.120 Data breaches have increased at a staggering rate; the amount of 
PII exposed doubled between 2018 and 2019, and the number of data breaches 
increased by seventeen percent in that single year.121 These breaches expose 
data at an astounding scale; in the last six years, five separate data breaches 
each exposed over five hundred million people’s PII.122 
                                                                                                                           
 113 Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348 (quoting Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 A.2d 277, 279 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)). 
 114 See Goodman, supra note 20, at 4–5 (describing the history of the ELD in product liability 
cases). 
 115 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (noting the rationales of the paradigm); Johnson, supra note 
40, at 546–47 (arguing that private ordering is an impetus for the doctrine); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 
1022–29 (justifying the stranger paradigm). 
 116 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 546–47 (discussing how the ELD promotes private ordering 
when parties negotiate for contracts). 
 117 See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 
(N.Y. 2001) (noting how the imposition of liability would allow recovery by unforeseeable plaintiffs); 
Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (describing the policy goals of the stranger paradigm). 
 118 See infra notes 258–299 and accompanying text. 
 119 See In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Costumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 475–76 
(D. Md. 2020) (distinguishing data breach litigation from product liability litigation); Frye, supra note 
108, at 367 (elaborating upon how the cybersecurity industry is different from other industries). 
 120 See Commission Regulation 2016/679, supra note 3, at 33 (defining a data breach); Alison Grace 
Johansen, What Is a Data Breach?, NORTON (Mar. 10, 2020), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-
privacy-data-breaches-what-you-need-to-know.html [https://perma.cc/5H7Z-2SRU] (same). 
 121 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 2 (detailing data breach statistics across a 
variety of different industries); Caban, supra note 12 (discussing the trend of data breaches in the 
healthcare industry). 
 122 See Abi Tyas Tunggal, The 52 Biggest Data Breaches, UPGUARD, https://www.upguard.com/
blog/biggest-data-breaches [https://perma.cc/MYX5-TQHB] (Feb. 15, 2021) (listing the top fifty-two 
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Generally, there are three main categories of data breaches: (1) malicious 
attacks, (2) computer glitches, and (3) human error.123 The complexity of inter-
twined computer systems, the rate of innovation, and human fallibility render 
even the most sophisticated cybersecurity firewalls susceptible.124 Cybersecu-
rity professionals are in a never-ending metaphorical arms race with hackers to 
ensure that their defensive cybersecurity systems remain more capable than the 
hackers’ offensive systems.125 
The defensive capabilities of data controllers and processors, however, 
are no longer well matched to hackers’ offensive capabilities due to chronic 
underinvestment.126 Some scholars have maintained that the inadequate cyber-
                                                                                                                           
data breaches that have occurred). As of February 2021, the top five data breaches are: (1) CAM4 data 
breach in 2020, which exposed 10.88 billion PII, including the full names and sexual orientation of 
users, (2) Yahoo data breach in 2017, which exposed three billion users’ passwords and security ques-
tions, (3) Aadhaar in 2018, which exposed 1.1 billion biometric data, (4) First American Financial 
Corporation in 2019, which exposed 885 million records of users, and (5) Verifications.io in 2019, 
which exposed 763 million users’ data. Id. 
 123 See PONEMON INST., IBM SEC., COST OF A DATA BREACH REPORT 8, 15 (2019), https://www.
ibm.com/downloads/cas/RDEQK07R [https://perma.cc/3YEW-8599] (explaining the three general 
causes of data breaches). 
 124 See MAJORITY STAFF OF H. COMM. ON OVERSIGHT & GOV’T REFORM, 115TH CONG., REP. 
ON THE EQUIFAX DATA BREACH 54 (Comm. Print 2018), https://republicans-oversight.house.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2018/12/Equifax-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6BZ-6RN7] (describing the Equifax 
data breach, the issues that arose between the interaction of complex software with outdated systems, 
and how those two systems were patchwork, making them not work well with one another); N.Y. CYBER 
TASK FORCE, COLUMBIA SCH. OF INT’L & PUB AFFS., BUILDING A DEFENSIBLE CYBERSPACE 4–7 
(2017), https://www.sipa.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/3668_SIPA%20Defensible%20Cyberspace-
WEB.PDF [https://perma.cc/9ZJT-S5DA] (explaining the problems that entities face when trying to 
secure their networks from data breaches); Jeffery L. Vagle, Cybersecurity and Moral Hazard, 23 
STAN. TECH. L. REV. 71, 86 (2020) (stating that there is a correlation between the complexity of a 
software system and security issues with that system). 
 125 See Roman V. Yampolskiy, AI Is the Future of Cybersecurity, for Better and for Worse, 
HARV. BUS. REV. (May 8, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/05/ai-is-the-future-of-cybersecurity-for-better-
and-for-worse [https://perma.cc/3M29-D2DR] (describing the rise and innovation of cybersecurity 
artificial intelligence as an arms race between hackers and industry). Governments are joining the 
arms race by investing resources into their defensive and offensive capabilities. See Anthony Craig & 
Brandon Valeriano, Conceptualizing Cyber Arms Races, 2016 8TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON 
CYBER CONFLICT: CYBER POWER 141, 146, 153 (N. Pissanidis et al. eds., 2016) (detailing that the 
United States, South Korea, and North Korea have built up their cyber weaponry). In 2019, 23% of 
recorded data breaches involved nation-state attackers. VERIZON, 2019 DATA BREACH INVESTIGA-
TIONS REPORT: EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 2 (2019), https://d110erj175o600.cloudfront.net/wp-content/
uploads/2019/05/2019-DBIR-Executive-Summary.pdf [https://perma.cc/D398-VECM]. An attack by 
a nation-state raises unique hurdles for data controllers and entities, as their capabilities typically far 
surpass that of a single hacker. See The Nation State Actor Has a ‘License to Hack’—and They Use It 
Target Their Adversaries, BAE SYS., https://www.baesystems.com/en/cybersecurity/feature/the-nation-
state-actor [https://perma.cc/2KU7-2RXQ] (identifying that the resources at the disposal of a nation-
state allows it to engage in complex attacks on a wide variety of fronts). 
 126 See KELLY BISSELL ET AL., ACCENTURE SEC., INNOVATE FOR CYBER RESILIENCE: LESSONS 
FROM LEADERS TO MASTER CYBERSECURITY EXECUTION 8 (2020) (providing an overview of the 
cybersecurity market), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-116/Accenture-Cybersecurity-
Report-2020.pdf#zoom=40 [https://perma.cc/WAP5-B4CL]; NASDAQ, CYBERSECURITY: INDUSTRY 
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security practices and investments by data controllers and processors are a re-
sult of the moral hazard that exists between the data controllers and processor 
and data sources.127 Under this theory, the absence of sufficient civil liability 
for data controllers and processors, following a data breach, encourages them 
to shift the negative externalities of weak cybersecurity systems onto the con-
sumer or other entities.128 The market incentives promote innovation and profit 
at the expense of cybersecurity.129 For instance, following a data breach that 
exposed the credit card numbers of fifty-six million Americans, Home Depot 
suffered only twenty-five million dollars in liability—0.1% of their net reve-
                                                                                                                           
REPORT & INVESTMENT CASE—HXR 3–4 (2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/docs/2020/04/23/Cyber-
security-Industry-Report-Investment-Case-HXR.pdf [https://perma.cc/CUZ2-P59N] (detailing how 
the aggregate value of cybersecurity venture deals has dropped from $8 billion in 2017 to just over $5 
billion in 2019, despite a consistent rise in the data breach losses); Nathaniel Grow & Scott J. Shackel-
ford, The Sport of Cybersecurity: How Professional Sport Leagues Can Better Protect the Competi-
tive Integrity of Games, 61 B.C. L. REV. 474, 477–81 (2020) (noting that the lack of cybersecurity 
investment within professional sports has left teams and fans exposed to cybersecurity breaches); 
Sales, supra note 1, at 1508 (“Companies face little risk of liability to those who are harmed by attacks 
on their systems or products, and they therefore have weaker incentives to identify and patch vulnerabili-
ties.”); Vagle, supra note 124, at 86 (arguing that the main focus of manufacturers of products in the 
digital space is innovation rather than cybersecurity); Benjamin Dean, Why Companies Have Little In-
centive to Invest in Cybersecurity, THE CONVERSATION (Mar. 4, 2015), http://theconversation.com/why-
companies-have-little-incentive-to-invest-in-cybersecurity-37570 [https://perma.cc/WEM2-L2DN]. 
Admittedly, the total value of cybersecurity investment by data controllers and processors has in-
creased in recent years. See NASDAQ, supra, at 3 (reviewing market investment growth in cybersecuri-
ty). The rise in investment should be viewed together with the fact that across seventeen core compo-
nents of cybersecurity, the average price of those components has increased by 25%. BISSEL ET AL., 
supra, at 8. Additionally, increased investment has not translated to heightened sufficiency of cyber-
security systems. Id. For instance, the bottom 74% of companies in terms of cybersecurity standards, 
on average, reported that only 55% of their business is secure as well as only 55% of them detected 
breaches while in progress. Id. 
 127 See Vagle, supra note 124, at 190–91 (arguing that issues with poor cybersecurity investments 
stem from inadequate liability); Dean, supra note 126 (defining the problem as a moral hazard, where 
there is an incentive to shift losses onto the consumer). A moral hazard “occurs when one person or 
organization takes greater risks because others bear the burden or costs of those risks.” Dean, supra 
note 126. 
 128 See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss Doctrine in 
the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. 935, 980–82 (2016) (arguing that the ELD results in the 
inability to control the externalities that arise from data breaches and poor cybersecurity); Sales, supra 
note 1, at 1508 (arguing that companies face minimal liability for data breaches). 
 129 See Vagle, supra note 124, at 92–95; Alex Blau, The Behavioral Economics of Why Execu-
tives Underinvest in Cybersecurity, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 7, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-
behavioral-economics-of-why-executives-underinvest-in-cybersecurity [https://perma.cc/FV3P-DBN5]. 
The market incentivizes innovation and rewards the first company to introduce their product to the 
consumer. Vagle, supra note 124, at 90 n.79. Stakeholders in the decision-making process often have 
incentives to neglect cybersecurity for the increased profits that unbridled innovation and speed can 
bring to their companies. Id. at 92–95; Blau, supra. In most cases, the return on investment in innova-
tion and speed programs dwarfs the typical return on cybersecurity investment. See Vagle, supra note 
124, at 92–95 (describing the typical pattern among companies to promote innovation at the expense 
of cybersecurity); Blau, supra (identifying the incentives that executives have to prioritize profit). 
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nue.130 Credit unions tasked with indemnifying their customers, however, suf-
fered sixty million dollars in damages as a result of the Home Depot breach.131 
Proponents of increased civil liability for data controllers and processors allege 
that tougher penalties will counteract the perverse market incentives of the cy-
bersecurity market by making the potential liability costs of underinvestment 
significantly greater than the cost of adequate investment upfront.132 
The roadblocks for plaintiffs who wish to bring tort, statutory, or contract-
based claims all contribute to the lack of liability for data controllers and pro-
cessors post-breach.133 The lack of federal cybersecurity regulation has result-
ed in civil liability, arguably acting as the invisible hand influencing data con-
trollers and processors’ decisions regarding cybersecurity.134 Data breach law-
suits are typically either dismissed before trial or settled; no consumer data 
breach litigation case has ever been tried.135 As a result, the factual question of 
the actual adequacy of the data controller or processor’s systems is generally 
not a determinative factor for the lawsuit outcome.136 Instead, success hinges 
on the ability of the plaintiff to overcome procedural hurdles involving doc-
trines—like the ELD—that were developed in a different economic age and 
thus ill-suited for resolving cybersecurity matters.137 Dismissal leaves little 
                                                                                                                           
 130 See Dean, supra note 126 (illustrating the liability that Home Depot faced following an inter-
nal data breach). 
 131 See id. (describing the costs that third parties faced as a result of the Home Depot breach). 
 132 See Keith N. Hylton, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Immunity: An Application to Cyber-
space, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (2007) (arguing that the imposition of liability economically is efficient 
to combat externalities); Opderbeck, supra note 128, at 980–82 (explaining the theory around in-
creased liability). 
 133 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (arguing that incentives to invest in data security are weak 
because data breaches do not automatically create civil liability, and attributing this to the ELD and 
the inadequacy of contract law as a viable cause of action). 
 134 See Joseph V. DeMarco & Bryan A. Fox, Data Rights and Data Wrongs: Civil Litigation and 
the New Privacy Norms, 128 YALE L.J.F. 1016, 1025 (2019), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/pdf/
DeMarcoFox_6vcfc47c.pdf [https://perma.cc/J5ZY-DGT5] (arguing that because there is no applica-
ble federal regulation, civil liability is the predominate default driver of cybersecurity and data privacy 
standards). 
 135 See, e.g., In re Anthem, Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 318–19 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(describing the lack of precedent of data breach litigation at trial while discussing whether a proposed 
settlement should be approved); Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Appellees at 21–25, Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 863 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (No. 
16-7108) (explaining that data breach class action lawsuits are generally decided at the settlement 
stage, not on the merits). 
 136 See In re Anthem, Inc., 327 F.R.D. at 317 (explaining how the outcome of litigation seldom 
rests on the actual adequacy of the cybersecurity systems). 
 137 See id. at 317–18 (attributing the lack of precedent to most cases settling post pre-trial mo-
tions); David Balser et al., INSIGHT: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 
4, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/insight-data-breach-litigation-
trends-to-watch [https://perma.cc/7FTV-C2P6] (stating that plaintiffs will continue to struggle to es-
tablish standing); Andrew C. Glass & Matthew N. Lowe, Deepening the Divide: D.C. Circuit Contin-
ues Circuit Split Regarding Standing in Data Breach Class Action Based on Risk of Future Harm, 
NAT’L L. REV. (July 9, 2019), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/deepening-divide-dc-circuit-
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recourse for data breach victims, as the provisions of data-related contracts 
generally do not include enumerated damages—thus victims have few avenues 
for statutory-based recovery.138 
E. The Payment Card Industry’s Data Security Standards:  
Think Before You Swipe 
A recurring manifestation of the third-party problem in data breach litiga-
tion, due to the ubiquity of the credit payment networks, is the Payment Card 
Industry Data Security Standards (PCI-DSS).139 The PCI-DSS is a comprehen-
sive governing scheme—advanced by credit card associations, such as Visa or 
Mastercard—that establish cybersecurity standards for the securing of individ-
uals’ credit card data.140 There are five actors within the PCI-DSS system: (1) 
the bank card associations, (2) the card-issuing banks, (3) the cardholders, (4) 
the acquiring banks that operate the payment networks, and (5) the merchants 
or retailers.141 The damages provisions in the individual contracts between par-
ties in the credit card payment network enforces the PCI-DSS.142 For example, 
                                                                                                                           
continues-circuit-split-regarding-standing-data-breach [https://perma.cc/2CQT-FM3Q] (describing a 
circuit split over plaintiffs’ ability to get standing in data breach litigation). 
 138 See In re Anthem, Inc., 327 F.R.D. at 317–19; Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the Unit-
ed States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees, supra note 135, at 23–24 (illustrating how data 
breach litigation is generally resolved through settlement). A successful defense of a motion to dis-
miss may all but guarantee some compensation for the damages caused by the data breach. In re An-
them, Inc., 327 F.R.D. at 317–19. 
 139 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 813–15 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(applying the ELD to data breach litigation involving the credit card payment network); In re Arby’s 
Rest. Grp. Inc. Litig., C.A. No. 17-cv-0514, 2018 WL 2128441, at *12 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018) (ap-
plying the ELD to a data breach lawsuit which involved the payment card industry’s data security 
standards); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–68 (describing the credit card payment network as the 
incarnation of the third-party problem in data breach litigation). 
 140 See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, PAYMENT CARD INDUSTRY (PCI) DATA SECURITY 
STANDARDS: REQUIREMENTS AND SECURITY ASSESSMENT PROCEDURES 10 (2018), https://www.
pcisecuritystandards.org/documents/PCI_DSS_v3-2 [https://perma.cc/DG28-YNRH] (“The PCI DSS 
security requirements apply to all system components included in or connected to the cardholder data 
environment.”); PCI Security, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/
pci_security/ [https://perma.cc/A488-2XPV] (explaining that the major card associations founded the 
Payment Card Industry (PIC)). 
 141 S. Indep. Bank v. Fred’s, Inc., No. 15-CV-00799, 2019 WL 1179396, at *2–4 (M.D. Ala. Mar. 
13, 2019) (reviewing the credit card payment system, the parties involved in the system, and the con-
tractual commitments that come with the PCI-DSS). See generally PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, 
supra note 140, at 5 (stating that the PCI-DSS applies to all parties involved in the processing, hold-
ing, or securing of credit card data). 
 142 See Fred’s, Inc., 2019 WL 1179396, at *2–4 (explaining that the Payment Card Industry Data 
Security Standards’ (PCI-DSS) contract has provisions that allow a party in the system to enforce the 
terms of the PCI-DSS against another party to the PCI-DSS that is in violation of the contract, or has 
suffered a data breach); Leonard Wills, The Payment Card Industry Data Security Standards, ABA J. 
(Jan. 3, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/minority-trial-lawyer/practice/
2019/the-payment-card-industry-data-security-standard/ [https://perma.cc/BQ4U-WG4D] (“Though 
the PCI DSS is not the law, it applies to merchants in at least two ways: (1) as part of a contractual 
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even though an acquiring bank143 may not have a direct contract with an issu-
ing bank,144 through their contracts with the credit card associations, both par-
ties agree to operate in compliance with the guidelines that the PCI-DSS 
framework establishes.145 Included within the PCI-DSS are provisions such as 
fines on individuals that fail to comply with the scheme, standards for securing 
credit card data, and indemnification provisions that allow injured parties to re-
cover damages.146 To be involved in the credit card payment network, a retailer 
or bank must agree to adhere to all the provisions and standards set by the PCI-
DSS.147 The PCI-DSS presents a common manifestation of the third-party prob-
lem in data breach litigation, and highlights notable policy issues due to the di-
versity of the parties involved ranging from an individual consumer to massive 
corporations such as Visa.148 Application of the ELD to the PCI-DSS has been 
a common challenge for multiple courts across multiple jurisdictions and thus 
has resulted in widely varying outcomes for injured plaintiffs.149 
II. DATA BREACH & THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE:  
THE PERFECT STORM FOR CIRCUIT SPLITS 
The complex nature of data breach litigation has resulted in a perfect 
storm for widely differing applications of the ELD in data breach litigation 
across jurisdictions, despite comparatively similar facts.150 The lack of uni-
                                                                                                                           
relationship between a merchant and card company, and (2) states may write portions of the PCI DSS 
into state law.”). 
 143 Glossary, PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pci_security/
glossary [https://perma.cc/4ZT3-T8CM] (defining “acquiring bank” as “a financial institution, that 
processes payment card transactions for merchants”). 
 144 See id. (defining “issuer bank” as an “[e]ntity that issues payment cards or performs, facili-
tates, or supports issuing services”). 
 145 See Fred’s, Inc., 2019 WL 1179396, at *2–4; Wills, supra note 142 (illuminating that the PCI-
DSS applies to all involved parties through contract). 
 146 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 809 (7th Cir. 2018) (ex-
plaining that parties within the PCI-DSS may be fined for noncompliance); Jeff Petters, What Is PCI 
Compliance: Requirements and Penalties, VARONIS, https://www.varonis.com/blog/pci-compliance/ 
[https://perma.cc/82KZ-XKB3] (Mar. 29, 2020) (“Fines vary from $5,000 to $100,000 per month until 
the merchants achieve compliance.”). 
 147 See Petters, supra note 146 (describing the indemnification process for injured parties within 
the system). 
 148 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348, 367–72 (describing the complexity of the third-party prob-
lem and suggesting that courts have often misapplied the ELD in that context). 
 149 See id. at 371 (discussing how courts have misapplied the ELD in data breach litigation). 
 150 See, e.g., In re Target Corp. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 1172–77 
(D. Minn. 2014) (applying the ELD of eleven different states in a data breach class action, and finding 
that, in six of the states, the ELD would bar the plaintiffs’ negligence claims, and in five of the states, 
the ELD would not bar such claims for various reasons). See generally MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & 
LEHRER, S.C., ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN ALL 50 STATES 13–36, https://www.mwl-law.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/ECONOMIC-LOSS-DOCTRINE-CHART-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/65AP-
A6WG] (2021) (listing the ELD rules of all fifty states). 
2021] The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breaches 1689 
formity in the application of the ELD and its exceptions has resulted in a plain-
tiff’s success hinging on the particular approach of the jurisdiction where their 
claims are brought, instead of on the merits of their case.151 It is common in 
data breach litigation class actions, in which all class members suffered the 
same injury from the same breach, for one group of plaintiffs to have their case 
dismissed under one state’s law, foreclosing damages, while a similar group is 
permitted to proceed.152 
For instance, in 2014, in In re Target Corp. Customer Data Security 
Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota grap-
pled with a multi-jurisdictional class action in which the court had to decide 
whether to apply the ELD to the negligence claims of plaintiffs from eleven 
different states.153 Operating within the stranger paradigm, the court found that 
six of the plaintiff’s states do not permit any ELD exceptions; thus, the ELD 
resulted in the dismissal of those claims.154 In the other five states’ ELD doc-
trines, various exceptions allowed those plaintiffs’ claims to survive dismis-
sal.155 Even within the five states that did not apply the ELD, the courts’ ra-
tionale as to why ranged from invoking fiduciary duty exceptions to citing a 
pure independent duty exception.156 The plaintiffs from the six states where the 
ELD would bar their tort claims had suffered the exact same damages, from 
the same breach event, as their co-plaintiffs, yet were left with a singular via-
                                                                                                                           
 151 See, e.g., In re Target Corp., 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–77 (holding that the ELD’s exceptions 
would only permit plaintiffs in five of the eleven states at issue to proceed with their tort claims). 
 152 See, e.g., id. 
 153 See id. In 2014, in In re Target Corp. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. 
District Court for the District of Minnesota emphasized that the Target data breach represented one of 
the largest in history at the time, exposing the credit card data of 110 million customers. Id. at 1158. 
The court recounted that the breach exposed the credit card numbers of all Target customers over a 
three-week holiday season period. Id. The Target customer plaintiffs alleged that, due to the data 
breach, they experienced credit card charges, late fees, and card replacement fees, as well as the bur-
den of credit monitoring. Id. 
 154 See id. at 1172–76 (distinguishing the current facts from cases where the parties had quasi-
privity, and dismissing the claims of three different states); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 348 (articulat-
ing what the stranger paradigm is). The court’s adoption of a stranger paradigm is most explicit in 
their judgement of the application of Pennsylvania’s ELD. See In re Target Corp., 66 F.3d at 1175–
76. The defendant sought to invoke prior state case law surrounding data breaches in the credit card 
payment system where the plaintiff and defendant were both financial institutions found to have quasi-
privity due to the PCI-DSS. Id. at 1175. The court found that the existence of privity made application 
of the ELD “more straightforward,” as the parties were financial institutions engaged in lengthy con-
tracts, rather than consumer retailers whose only contractual privity manifested from Target purchas-
es. Id. The court noted that this lack of privity, however, did not foreclose the possibility of an excep-
tion for the Pennsylvania plaintiffs. See id. 1175–76 (allowing the Pennsylvania plaintiffs’ claims to 
survive dismissal). 
 155 See In re Target Corp., 66 F.3d at 1172–76 (refusing to dismiss the ELD of five states, as the 
plaintiffs had sufficiently pled that an ELD exception might apply). 
 156 See id. (applying the ELD exceptions of five states, ranging from the fiduciary duty, special 
relationship, and traditional independent duty exceptions to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims). 
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ble claim of unjust enrichment.157 Their co-plaintiffs from states that would not 
apply the ELD in this context, however, could still pursue negligence claims, 
thus giving them greater leverage in settlement negotiations.158 
In the years since In re Target Corp., state supreme courts have routinely 
adopted more pliable versions of the ELD to permit exceptions in data breach 
litigation.159 In the seminal 2018 decision Dittman v. UPMC, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania expanded Pennsylvania’s ELD to provide an independ-
ent duty exception.160 Under the commonwealth’s independent duty exception, 
the ELD would not apply if the plaintiffs, employees of a medical center, could 
sufficiently plead that the defendant, the medical center, owed them a duty of 
care.161 To reach this holding, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had to distin-
guish precedent that endorsed a more restrictive version of the ELD.162 No 
precedent had expressly held that an independent duty exception existed; in-
stead, the court relied on prior language that simply alluded to the practical 
reality that under some undefined circumstances the ELD should not apply.163 
Dittman highlights the hurdles that plaintiffs face in data breach litigation 
and illustrates how courts have struggled to allow for the imposition of liability 
while preserving consistency with ELD precedent and policy goals.164 This Part 
                                                                                                                           
 157 See id. at 1178–79 (holding that plaintiffs’ claims of unjust enrichment were plausible enough 
to survive dismissal, but dismissing most of the plaintiffs’ causes of actions). 
 158 Id.; Laura Inglis et al., Experiments on the Effects of Cost Shifting, Court Costs, and Discovery 
on the Efficient Settlement of Tort Claims, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 89, 91 (2005) (explaining the eco-
nomic decisions that typically underlie settlements). 
 159 See 66 F.3d at 1178–79; Jason M. Rand, “Common Law Duty to Protect Employee Data Un-
dercuts Contractual Liability Exclusion,” CYBERINSURANCE L. BLOG (Dec. 3, 2018), https://www.
databreachninja.com/common-law-duty-to-protect-employee-data-undercuts-contractual-liability-
exclusion/ [https://perma.cc/UY8T-L9ET] (noting that a spring of cases has shown that courts are 
routinely finding ways to impose liability in data breach litigation). 
 160 See 196 A.3d 1036, 1040 (Pa. 2018) (holding broadly that an independent duty exception to 
the commonwealth’s ELD rule would apply, so long as the plaintiff could successfully plead that such 
a duty existed independently under the common law). In 2018, in Dittman v. UPMC, the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania was operating in the stranger paradigm of the ELD. See id. at 1054 (stating that 
the applicable duty did not come from contract law). The court held that if a duty arises through con-
tract, it will preclude tort remedies; however, if that duty exists in the common law, then the ELD will 
not bar the claims. Id. The court concluded that the employment contract did not establish any duties 
related to the securing of data. See id. (stating that contract law did not govern). 
 161 Id. at 1055. 
 162 See id. at 1054 (describing prior case law that had invoked a far more absolute version of the 
doctrine). 
 163 See id. (quoting prior precedent that alluded to ELD exceptions). The court’s final justification 
for a new independent duty exception came from a 1995 South Carolina Supreme Court decision, 
cited in a previous Pennsylvania ELD case. Id. In that case, the South Carolina Supreme Court noted 
that, despite a potential ELD bar, economic recovery could come from a variety of tort claims. Id. 
Applying that reasoning, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Dittman concluded that there should and 
does exist an independent duty exception to the ELD. Id. 
 164 See id. (highlighting that the common law is not stagnant, and noting that it is within the abil-
ity of state supreme courts to ensure that the law evolves with changing facts and times, as with the 
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further analyzes the ELD and data breach litigation by providing case illustra-
tions where the ELD did and did not apply under both the stranger paradigm and 
contracting parities paradigm.165 Section A discusses instances under both para-
digms where courts have applied the ELD to bar a plaintiff’s tort claims for data 
breach litigation, as there was either no exception to the rule or the exception did 
not apply.166 Section B explores instances where courts in both paradigms have 
decided not to apply the ELD to plaintiffs’ tort claims in data breach litigation 
because there existed an applicable ELD exception under state law.167 
A. Data Breach and the Economic Loss Doctrine: When Courts Have 
Applied the Economic Loss Doctrine in Data Breach Litigation 
Courts have applied the ELD in data breach litigation under both the 
stranger and contracting parties paradigms.168 The contracting parties paradigm 
is implicated when the parties in data breach litigation have a contract govern-
ing the rights and duties owed between them relating to the PII.169 The stranger 
paradigm in data breach litigation is often implicated when the parties do not 
have direct contractual privity governing the rights and duties owed between 
them.170 Subsection 1 of this Section examines when courts have applied the 
ELD in the contracting parties paradigm due to a contract governing the rights 
and duties between the plaintiff and defendant.171 Subsection 2 analyzes when 
courts have applied the ELD in the stranger paradigm, as no independent duty 
existed between the parties.172 Subsection 3 discusses when courts have ap-
plied the ELD to third-party problems involving the PCI-DSS, characterizing 
the parties as within the contracting parties paradigm and letting the terms and 
conditions of the PCI-DSS govern damages.173 
1. Contracting Parties: When the Economic Loss Doctrine Applies to 
Contracting Parties in Data Breach Litigation 
In the contracting parties paradigm, courts have routinely applied the 
ELD to data breach litigation cases in an effort to restrict recovery to contract 
                                                                                                                           
changing landscape of the digital economy and the unique facts it creates); Rand, supra note 159 (not-
ing the trend for state supreme courts to allow for liability in data breach litigation). 
 165 See infra notes 168–212 and accompanying text. 
 166 See infra notes 213–251 and accompanying text. 
 167 See infra notes 174–212 and accompanying text. 
 168 See infra notes 174–212 and accompanying text. 
 169 Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344–45 (defining the contracting parties paradigm). 
 170 See id. at 344 (describing the stranger paradigm). 
 171 See infra notes 174–197 and accompanying text. 
 172 See infra notes 198–204 and accompanying text. 
 173 See infra notes 205204–212 and accompanying text. 
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law, and the contract itself, by foreclosing tort recovery.174 For example, in 
2016, in Silverpop Systems, Inc. v. Leading Market Technologies, Inc., the U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that Georgia’s ELD barred tort 
claims arising from a data breach where there existed contractual privity be-
tween the parties.175 Georgia’s ELD includes an independent duty exception; 
however, the court held that, when an independent non-contractual common 
law duty of care is supplanted by the terms of a contract, the ELD operates as a 
complete shield against tort liability for purely economic damages.176 The 
plaintiff’s negligence claim explicitly related to the defendant’s duties—
already established through contract—to reasonably safeguard the plaintiff’s 
data.177 The court held that for the plaintiff to recover damages resulting from 
the breach, they were confined to the contract terms and thus could not assert 
other tort liability.178 
Similarly, in 2020, in In re Marriott International, Inc., Customer Data 
Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland 
explained in dicta that the applicable state ELD barred tort claims for purely 
economic losses between two parties who have entered into a contract.179 The 
                                                                                                                           
 174 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 2018) (explic-
itly adopting the contracting parties paradigm to bar the plaintiffs’ tort claims); Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. 
Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 850–51 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (applying the 
ELD to bar the tort claims of the plaintiff because their existed a contract between the parties); In re 
Marriott Int’l, Inc., Costumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 475–76 (D. Md. 2020) 
(holding that the ELD barred the tort claims of the plaintiffs where a contract existed); In re Sony 
Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 966–74 (S.D. Cal. 
2014) (applying the ELD because the plaintiffs had not satisfied the exception to the ELD in the con-
tracting parties paradigm); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 344–45 (defining the contracting parties para-
digm as when a contract governs the rights and duties owed between the plaintiff and defendant). 
 175 See 641 F. App’x at 853 (holding that the duty arose under the contract, which precluded tort 
liability due to the ELD). In 2016, in Silverpop Systems v. Leading Market Technologies, Inc., the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit noted that the plaintiff had entered into a marketing 
services agreement that required the plaintiff to store personal data on the provider defendant’s serv-
ers. Id. at 850. The contract contained provisions both limiting liability and governing the storage of 
the data. Id. In 2010, a data breach exposed the plaintiff’s PII. Id. 
 176 See id. at 853 (stating that the independent duty exception did not apply because the contract 
between the two parties governed the alleged duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant, and, thus, 
the ELD barred other claims). 
 177 See id. (holding that the contract between the defendant and the plaintiff governed the duties 
alleged to have broken). 
 178 Id. 
 179 See 440 F. Supp. 3d at 475–76 (stating, without officially deciding the issue, that Illinois’ ELD 
would most likely bar negligence suits). In 2020, in In re Marriott International, Inc., Costumer Data 
Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland explained that the 
defendant, a hotel chain, had acquired a smaller hotel chain to make it the largest hotel company in the 
world. Id. at 454–55. The data breach occurred at the acquired hotel chain’s locations. Id. The plain-
tiffs, guests of the hotel or users of other hotel services, would provide their name, address, phone 
number, payment information, other personal preferences, and in some cases passport information, 
when checking in or booking a room. Id. The ensuing data breach occurred continuously both before 
the acquisition and after from the years 2014 to 2018. Id. The breach exposed the data of all customers 
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defendant, a hotel chain, had agreed to “reasonable organizational, technical 
and administrative measures to protect [its customers’] Personal Data” in a 
contract with the plaintiffs, customers of Marriott properties and other ser-
vices.180 Despite the defendant’s attempts to ensure data security, a breach ex-
posed roughly 383 million visitor records, twenty-four million passport num-
bers, and nine million credit and debit card numbers.181 After a detailed analy-
sis of the applicable Illinois ELD in regards to the Illinois plaintiffs, the court 
stated that the ELD would most likely bar those affected customers’ claims, 
before noting that the Illinois Supreme Court may be amenable to changing the 
state’s ELD.182 
The district court acknowledged policy considerations weighing against 
application of the ELD but declined to make a pronouncement on the issue; it 
instead dismissed the Illinois plaintiffs’ case on the theory that, under Illinois 
law, the defendant owed no independent non-contractual duty to the plain-
tiffs.183 The Illinois Supreme Court had initially adopted the ELD to protect 
manufactures from the potentially unlimited economic damages that could 
arise from defective products.184 The court characterized that policy concern as 
inapplicable in the context of data breaches, however, because the claims at 
issue were not alleging defects in the defendant’s core product—hotel rooms—
but rather a separate harm from their handling of plaintiffs’ data.185 The court 
did not definitively rule on the applicability of the ELD to data breaches; how-
                                                                                                                           
at the acquired hotels location from the years 2014 to 2018. Id. The plaintiffs sued as a collective class 
ranging across seven states. Id. The court applied Illinois law to the Illinois plaintiffs. Id. 
 180 Id. at 483 (alteration in original) (quoting Second Amended Consolidated Complaint ¶ 317, id. 
(No. 19-md-2879)). 
 181 Id. at 454–55. 
 182 See id. at 475–76 (stating that without deciding on the issue that the Illinois Supreme Court 
may very well apply the ELD to bar tort claims in data breach litigation, but laying out a policy argu-
ment distinguishing the ELD from other types of tort claims). The In re Marriott court noted that the 
ELD was created in response to product liability litigation in Illinois. Id. The court noted that in the 
unique context of data breach litigation, however, the data product itself is never damaged, thus identi-
fying one reason why the Illinois Supreme Court should rework this ill-fitting doctrine. Id. 
 183 See id. at 475 (“Data security breach cases are unique in many ways.”). First, the court noted 
that data breach litigation is relatively new and that the doctrine surrounding it is not settled. See id. 
(noting that the transition to a digital economy has been recent). Secondly, the court sought to distin-
guish product liability litigation from data breach litigation because in data breach litigation the prod-
uct itself is not damaged. See id. at 475–76 (distinguishing data breach litigation from product liability 
litigation). 
 184 Id. at 475–76 (stating that the ELD was first implemented in product liability suits to protect a 
manufacturer of a defective product from the potentially unlimited liability that could arise if a court 
allowed economic losses due to the defective nature of the product without any further damages to 
property or persons). 
 185 Id. (“When the hotel induces the consumer to book a room online, and to hold the reservation 
by providing a bank card and other personal information, but fails to protect that information from 
hackers, the injury sustained by the consumer has nothing at all to do with the quality or fitness of the 
‘product’ purchased—the hotel room.”). 
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ever, it dismissed the Illinois plaintiffs’ claims for failure to demonstrate that 
an established exception to the ELD applied.186 
Some jurisdictions provide for exceptions to the ELD in the contracting 
parties paradigm.187 Most courts, however, still require plaintiffs to overcome 
the relatively high hurdle set by the special relationship test, which considers 
the six factors outlined in J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory in 1979, in the contracting 
parties paradigm to avail themselves of an ELD exception.188 In 2014, in In re 
Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of California applied the ELD to bar 
the specific California plaintiffs’ negligence claims against the defendants, de-
spite California’s established special relationship exception.189 The plaintiffs, 
users of the PlayStation Network, had turned over PII and agreed to a terms-
and-services contract in exchange for access to defendants’, entities of Sony, 
free gaming network.190 The plaintiffs, representing a multi-state class action, 
brought a combination of statutory-based and tort-based claims against the de-
fendants following a data breach.191 The court held that the ELD did not per se 
bar the tort claims of the California plaintiffs; however, the California plaintiffs 
                                                                                                                           
 186 Id. at 476 (“[I] find that based on the current state of Illinois law Defendants did not owe a 
duty to Plaintiffs to protect their personal information, notwithstanding that the Illinois Supreme Court 
itself has not spoken to the issue.”). The district court dismissed the Illinois plaintiffs’ negligence 
claims, leaving the affected customers without recourse or an available cause of action. See id. at 495 
(dismissing the negligence claims of the Illinois plaintiffs). The plaintiffs from California, Florida, 
Georgia, Maryland, Michigan, New York, and Oregon, however, were able to proceed forward with 
their claims. Id. These plaintiffs’ claims could proceed due to exceptions to the ELD and their ability 
to bring breach of contract claims. Id. at 495. 
 187 See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 
942, 966–74 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (holding that there was no special relationship because the plaintiffs had 
failed to plead facts). 
 188 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366 (illustrating that, within the contracting parties paradigm, 
the special relationship test is a higher standard). Compare Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-
30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (holding that the plaintiffs had ade-
quately pled that a special relationship existed with the defendants), with In re Sony Gaming Net-
works, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–74 (holding that the plaintiffs had failed to adequately plead that a 
special relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the defendants). 
 189 See 996 F. Supp. 2d at 966–74 (applying the ELD to the negligence claims of the plaintiffs). In 
2014, in In re Sony Gaming Networks & Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of California explained that the plaintiffs were all users of the defend-
ants’ online gaming network. Id. at 954. To sign up for the gaming network, the defendants required 
users to agree to their terms of service and register for accounts using PII. Id. In April of 2011, hack-
ers accessed the gaming network, shut it down for a period of four days, and stole the PII of many of 
the users. Id. None of the plaintiffs alleged that they suffered any financial harm because of the hack-
ing. Id. at 956–57. The plaintiffs were “a nationwide putative consumer class.” Id. at 953. 
 190 Id. at 954. 
 191 See id. at 953–54 (describing the causes of action that the plaintiffs alleged). 
2021] The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breaches 1695 
had failed to adequately plead that a special relationship existed and thus could 
not invoke an ELD exception.192 
To determine whether a special relationship existed in In re Sony Gaming 
Networks, the court applied the J’Aire test.193 In applying the special relationship 
test, a court must determine whether the combined weight of the nature of the 
relationship between the parties, the type of damages caused, and the policy 
goals implicated are such that additional tort liability should be imposed.194 The 
California court held that the California plaintiffs had sufficiently pled the 
fourth, fifth, and sixth J’Aire factors: (4) there was a close connection between 
the defendants’ conduct and the plaintiffs’ injury, (5) moral blame could be at-
tached to the defendants’ conduct, as they knew of their security lapses, and (6) 
imposing liability would incentivize other data controllers and processors to suf-
ficiently secure data.195 The court, however, held that the plaintiffs had failed to 
sufficiently plead the first, second, and third J’Aire factors: (1) the actions of the 
defendants affected all potential consumers, not just the plaintiffs, (2) the plain-
tiffs’ alleged injuries were not foreseeable to the defendant, and (3) there was not 
enough degree of certainty in the injuries.196 Considering the six factors collec-
tively, the court failed to find a special relationship between the parties, and it 
thus applied the ELD to the plaintiffs’ negligence claims.197 
                                                                                                                           
 192 See id. at 973 (holding that the California plaintiffs had failed to sufficiently plead that a spe-
cial relationship existed to permit their tort claims for purely economic damages). The U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of California’s holding in In re Sony Gaming Networks specifically 
related to the California plaintiffs. See id. (stating that California’s ELD barred the tort claims of the 
plaintiffs). The court concluded that the Massachusetts plaintiffs’ ELD claims were also barred be-
cause Massachusetts’s ELD generally prohibited the claims brought by those plaintiffs. See id. at 967 
(illustrating that the Massachusetts ELD generally prohibits economic damages and has few excep-
tions). 
 193 Id. at 967 (determining that the California plaintiffs had not sufficiently shown that the six-
factor special relationship exception applied to them). 
 194 See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (outlining the six factors and 
explaining the rationale behind them). 
 195 In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F.2d at 972 (finding that the plaintiffs had adequately 
pleaded the J’Aire factors, which favored the plaintiffs’ argument). 
 196 Id. at 970–72 (holding that the California plaintiffs’ claims were not enough for the court to 
determine that a special relationship existed between the two parties). The court’s holding hinged on 
the California plaintiffs’ abstract damage claims. See id. at 969–70 (noting that the California plain-
tiffs’ alleged facts did not reach the plausibility standard). The court rejected the plaintiffs’ allegation 
that the diminution in value of their gaming devices was a sufficient economic loss under the ELD’s 
special relationship test. Id. For that reason, among others, the court held that the special relationship 
exception should not apply. Id. 
 197 Id. at 966–74 (holding that, despite the plaintiffs pleading the fourth, fifth, and sixth factors 
adequately, their failure to establish the first three meant that a special relationship did not exist be-
tween the parties, and thus the ELD barred the plaintiffs’ negligence claims). 
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2. Stranger Paradigm: When No Contract Governs the Parties’ Relationship 
& the Economic Loss Doctrine Applies 
When a court finds that two parties lack contractual privity—thus impli-
cating a stranger paradigm—courts have applied the ELD to bar purely eco-
nomic claims.198 In these cases, no independent duty exception permits tort 
recovery.199 Although the common law is slowing evolving, this approach re-
mains the majority approach to the ELD.200 For example, in 2008, in Sovereign 
Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., the U.S. District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania applied Pennsylvania’s ELD to bar a negligence claim 
resulting from a data breach, as the plaintiffs, banks that issued credit cards to 
their customers, claimed to have solely suffered economic damages.201 The 
plaintiffs asserted that the foreseeability of the specific harm that befell them 
should trump the ELD because the facts did not implicate the stranger para-
digm’s policy goal of limiting unforeseeable liability.202 The court rejected this 
argument by invoking the policy goal implicated by the stranger paradigm—
the concern that allowing such negligence claims between parties without any 
contractual privity would permit “anyone ‘in the economic chain’” to hold the 
defendant responsible for economic damages.203 At the time of the Sovereign 
Bank decision, Pennsylvania’s ELD did not include an independent duty ex-
ception; thus, the rigid application of the doctrine applied to dismiss the plain-
tiffs’ tort claims.204 
                                                                                                                           
 198 See Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 2d 183, 203–04 (M.D. Pa. 
2005) (holding that the ELD barred the tort claims of the plaintiffs), aff’d, 533 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 
2008). 
 199 See, e.g., id. (baring the plaintiffs’ tort claims). 
 200 See MATTHIESEN, WICKERT & LEHRER, S.C., supra note 150, at 4 (describing the strict appli-
cation of the ELD as being the majority rule after conducting a fifty-state survey of the ELD). 
 201 395 F. Supp. 2d at 203–04. In 2008, in Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., the U.S. 
District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania noted that the plaintiffs were banks within the 
credit card network. Id. at 188–89. The defendant was a retailer who had suffered a data breach that 
exposed the PII of their customers. Id. The plaintiffs proceeded under a third-party beneficiary breach 
of contract claims and a negligence claim against the defendant. Id. at 191. At no point did the plain-
tiffs claim that privity existed, resulting in the court’s implicit adoption of a stranger paradigm ap-
proach. See id. (stating that the plaintiffs sought to plead equitable remedies of contract law, in that 
they were the third-party beneficiaries to the contract that defendant had signed); Sharkey, supra note 
18, at 350–51 (categorizing Sovereign Bank as a stranger paradigm case). 
 202 See Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 189–90 (arguing there was a high level of likelihood 
such a harm could occur); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 350–51 (noting that the plaintiffs sought to rely 
on the theory that the harm was foreseeable and that the ELD should not apply as a result). 
 203 See Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 204 (quoting Aikens v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 501 
A.2d 277, 279 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985)) (fearing that the imposition of economic damages would allow 
for any actor in the economic chain to bring tort claims); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 350–51 (stating 
the arguments of the plaintiffs). 
 204 See Sovereign Bank, 395 F. Supp. 2d at 205 (“We will therefore apply the economic loss doc-
trine to bar Sovereign’s negligence claim.”). Compare id. (applying the ELD to bar the negligence 
claims in a 2005 data breach litigation case), with Dittman v. UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1040 (Pa. 2018) 
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3. Third-Party Problem: When Parties in Data Breach Litigation Are Linked 
by a Web of Contracts and the Economic Loss Doctrine Applies 
Finally, some courts have applied the ELD in the third-party problem to 
data breach litigation involving the PCI-DSS system.205 The PCI-DSS’s com-
plex web of contracts requires the court to make a choice between applying the 
contracting parties paradigm or the stranger paradigm.206 For example, in 
2018, in Community Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit explicitly adopted the contracting parties 
paradigm and thus applied the ELD to bar the plaintiffs’, financial institutions 
that issued credit and debit cards to customers, tort claims following a breach 
in the defendant’s, a retailer, credit card processing system. 207 The court rea-
soned that since the PCI-DSS represents a set of contracts governing data stor-
age, and includes damages for non-compliance, the system embodies an allo-
cation of risk through contracting by sophisticated parties.208 The plaintiffs’ 
and defendant’s rights and duties were thus mutually governed by the PCI-DSS 
through contract, despite that contract not being directly with one another.209 
The “web of contracts” at issue amounted to sufficient privity to implicate the 
contracting parties paradigm.210 Accordingly, available remedies must be root-
ed in contract.211 The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ negligence claims and all 
                                                                                                                           
(holding that, in 2018, the Pennsylvania ELD includes an independent duty exception that allows 
negligence claims to proceed in data breach litigation). 
 205 See, e.g., Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(explicitly stating that the situation involved a third-party problem, and adopting the ELD to preclude 
the plaintiffs’ claims, as the plaintiffs had only suffered economic losses due to the negligence of the 
defendant). 
 206 See id.; Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–68 (describing the credit card payment network as the 
incarnation of the third-party problem in data breach litigation). 
 207 See 887 F.3d at 815 (holding that the ELD would bar the tort claims of the plaintiffs because 
they were operating within the contracting parties paradigm). In 2019, in Community Bank of Trenton 
v. Schnuck Markets, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit observed that the plain-
tiffs, financial institutions that issued credit cards and debit cards to customers, alleged that the de-
fendant, a grocery store, failed to secure data, causing them to incur financial losses by having to 
indemnify their customers. 887 F.3d at 807. Hackers had accessed seventy-nine of the defendant’s one 
hundred stores, and allegedly stole the credit card information of twenty thousand customers. Id. at 
810. The plaintiffs estimated to have incurred losses of approximately ten million. Id. at 811. 
 208 Id. at 815 (holding that the parties had voluntarily entered into a “web of contracts” that would 
define the rights and duties owed between them, which included remedies for damages that would 
occur and standards for the storage of data). 
 209 Id. (noting that a mutually agreed-upon standard governed the relationship between the par-
ties). 
 210 Id. (stating that the “web of contracts” within the PCI-DSS system amounted to quasi-privity 
between the two parties, and thus required the court to take a contracting parties paradigm approach). 
 211 See id. at 823 (declining to allow damages outside of the contract). 
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theories that would have supplemented the plaintiffs’ contractual remedies for 
the losses that they suffered due to the defendant’s alleged negligence.212 
B. When Courts Have Not Applied the Economic Loss Doctrine  
in Data Breach Litigation 
Some courts, in assessing similar facts as found in the aforementioned 
cases, have not applied the ELD to data breach litigation, and have instead 
adopted a more pliable version of the doctrine with exceptions that permit tort 
recovery for economic damages.213 Section B of this Part discusses instances 
in which courts did not apply the ELD in data breach litigation, despite the fact 
that plaintiffs were only asserting economic damages.214 Subsection 1 reviews 
when courts in the contracting parties paradigm have not applied the ELD due 
to the existence of a special relationship between the parties.215 Subsection 2 
examines when courts in the stranger paradigm have not applied the ELD be-
cause there existed a non-contractual independent duty, arising from the com-
mon law, between the parties.216 Subsection 3 analyzes when courts in a third-
party problem have not applied the ELD because a court determined that there 
existed no contractual privity between the parties.217 In these instances where a 
court has not applied the ELD, the courts permitted plaintiffs to move forward 
with the merits of their tort claims, and the incentives to settle greatly in-
creased their probability of recovery.218 
1. Contracting Parties Paradigm: When There Exists a Contract Between 
the Two Parties in Data Breach Litigation and the Court Did Not Apply 
the Economic Loss Doctrine 
It has famously been said that the ELD is an attempt to “to prevent the 
law of contract and the law of tort from dissolving into the other.”219 Simply 
                                                                                                                           
 212 Id. at 826 (“We agree with the district court that neither Illinois nor Missouri would recognize 
any of the plaintiff banks’ theories to supplement their contractual remedies for losses they suffered as 
a result of the Schnucks data breach.”). By denying any supplemental damages greater than agreed to 
in the contract, the Seventh Circuit in Community Bank of Trenton was de facto applying the ELD as a 
border line between tort and contract law. See id. (denying any damages that would result in more 
than what was agreed to in the contract); Johnson, supra note 40, at 551–52 (arguing that the ELD 
serves as a “boundary-line” between tort and contract law). 
 213 See infra notes 219–251 and accompanying text. 
 214 See infra notes 219–251 and accompanying text. 
 215 See infra notes 219–232 and accompanying text. 
 216 See infra notes 233–242 and accompanying text. 
 217 See infra notes 243–251 and accompanying text. 
 218 See infra notes 219–251 and accompanying text. 
 219 See R. Joseph Barton, Note, Drowning in a Sea of Contract: Application of the Economic Loss 
Rule to Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation Claims, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1789, 1796 (2000) 
(quoting Rich Prods. Corp. v. Kemutec, Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 937, 969 (E.D. Wis. 1999), aff’d, 241 
F.3d 915 (3d Cir. 2001)). 
2021] The Economic Loss Doctrine & Data Breaches 1699 
put, the ELD restricts a plaintiff’s recovery to solely damages delineated in the 
contract or those available through contract law.220 Despite this, some courts 
have carved out a special relationship exception to the contracting parties par-
adigm.221 This exception analyzes the relationship between the parties, the na-
ture of harm done, and other policy implications to determine if tort liability 
should be permitted despite a readably enforceable contract.222 In 2019, in 
Portier v. NEO Technology Solutions, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts did not apply the ELD to the plaintiffs’ tort claims, despite their 
contractual privity with the defendants arising from an employment con-
tract.223 The plaintiffs in Portier were employees of the defendants, NEO 
Technology Solutions and affiliates, and their employment contract required 
them to turn over PII.224 A phishing email scam resulted in a data breach ex-
posing the plaintiffs’ PII.225 Portier involved two classes of plaintiffs, with one 
group located in Massachusetts and the other in California.226 The court ap-
plied the J’Aire special relationship test to the plaintiffs located in California 
and determined that those plaintiffs had sufficiently pled that a special rela-
tionship existed.227 Because the Massachusetts ELD foreclosed recovery for 
the Massachusetts plaintiffs, the court did not permit those plaintiffs to bring 
tort claims, despite the fact that these plaintiffs suffered the exact same harm 
from the data breach as did their California counterparts. 228 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See id. (describing how the ELD separates contract and tort law). 
 221 See, e.g., Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (D. 
Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (applying the special relationship test to the ELD in data breach litigation when 
the parties had a contractual relationship). 
 222 See, e.g., J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (detailing a six-factor test, 
which balances causation and the moral blame factors, with the policy impact of imposing liability). 
 223 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (explaining that the parties had entered into an employment 
contract). In 2019, in Portier v. NEO Technology Solutions, the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Massachusetts explained that the plaintiffs were employees of the key defendant, NEO Technology 
Solutions—a tech company—and that the terms of their employment contract required them to turn 
over PII to the key defendant. Id. at *1. The vice president of that defendant company had opened a 
phishing email that resulted in the disclosure of the employees’ tax forms. Id. The forms were pass-
word protected, but the hackers guessed the password. Id. The key defendant quickly discovered the 
breach and took steps to re-secure its systems. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that they had already suffered 
damages due to the breach and were likely to suffer damages further damages in the future. Id. at *2. 
 224 Id. at *1 (explaining that a data breach had exposed the W2 forms of the plaintiffs). 
 225 Id. 
 226 Id. 
 227 Id. at *17–22 (applying the J’Aire test to the negligence claims of the California plaintiffs). 
The district court did not apply the ELD to the Massachusetts plaintiffs’ negligence claims. Id. at *20. 
As the law stood, however, the court could not affirmatively allow the plaintiffs’ claims to go forward. 
Id. Yet the court predicted that, as the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania did in Dittman v. UMPC, the 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court could adopt an exception to the ELD. See id. (“[I]t is likely 
that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court . . . would apply Dittman’s reasoning and permit re-
covery for pecuniary losses due to Defendants’ negligence in the circumstances presented here.”). 
 228 See id. at *17–30 (applying the ELD to the Massachusetts plaintiffs because Massachusetts 
law prohibited tort recovery for economic damages). 
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The court concluded that the California plaintiffs met all six J’Aire factors: 
(1) the defendants intended the transaction to specifically affect the plaintiffs, as 
the plaintiffs were required to turn over their data due to their employment sta-
tus, (2) the defendant’s previous data breaches made the harm foreseeable, (3) 
the plaintiffs sufficiently pled injury, (4) there was a temporally close connection 
between the defendant’s conduct and the harm, (5) the moral blame was signifi-
cant, as the defendant failed to take the necessary steps to protect the plaintiffs’ 
data after requiring that plaintiffs hand over their data, and (6) imposing tort lia-
bility would incentivize employers to properly secure vulnerable employee da-
ta.229 Accordingly, the court did not apply the ELD to the tort claims of the Cali-
fornia plaintiffs.230 The court dismissed, for unrelated reasons, all the statutory 
claims brought by the multi-state plaintiff class.231 The Massachusetts plaintiffs 
were thus left without any viable cause of action, while the California plaintiffs’ 
case proceeded forward due to the special relationship test.232 
2. Stranger Paradigm: When No Contract Exists Between the Parties in Data 
Breach Litigation and the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply 
When operating in the stranger paradigm, in which no pre-existing legal 
relationship exists, some courts have invoked an independent duty exception to 
the ELD in data breach litigation—holding that the defendant owed the plain-
tiff a duty to reasonably secure their data.233 For example, in 2019, in In re 
Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia did not apply the ELD to the tort 
claims of plaintiffs, financial institutions, who lacked contractual privity with 
the defendant, Equifax and its affiliates.234 First, the defendant sought to in-
voke Community Bank of Trenton and thus implicate a third-party problem, 
hoping to convince the court that the contracting parties paradigm should apply 
                                                                                                                           
 229 See id. at *17 (holding that the plaintiffs sufficiently pleaded that the six-factor test was met 
and that there existed a special relationship between the two parties that would allow for the plaintiffs 
to be able to bring tort claims for purely economic damages). 
 230 Id. at *30. 
 231 Id. 
 232 Id. 
 233 See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (holding that the ELD would not apply to the plaintiffs’ tort claims because defend-
ants had an independent duty to reasonably secure data). 
 234 Id. (stating that the ELD did not apply due to the existence of an independent duty owed be-
tween the two parties). In 2019, in In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the 
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia noted that the plaintiffs (financial institutions) 
alleged that the defendants (a credit reporting company and its affiliates) had failed to adequately 
secure PII that they relied on to value customers’ credit scores. Id. at 1157. This inability to accurately 
determine customers’ credit worthiness resulted in economic damages. Id. The data breach exposed 
150 million individuals’ PII. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had been warned of vulner-
abilities in their systems but failed to take steps to secure customer data. Id. 
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to limit recovery to the contractual provisions of the PCI-DSS.235 The court, 
however, distinguished the case facts from the unique network of contracts 
created by the PCI-DSS.236 The In re Equifax, Inc. court, citing to Community 
Bank of Trenton, found that in this case, the “sensitive data [was] collected and 
then disclosed by private, third-party actors who [were] not involved in the 
customers’ or banks’ direct transactions.”237 None of the pre-existing legal 
rights, duties, or remedies presented in Community Bank of Trenton existed 
between the parties in In re Equifax, Inc.238 Accordingly, the court implicitly 
adopted the stranger paradigm.239 The court then held that Georgia’s ELD in-
cluded an independent duty exception.240 Prior cases had established that when 
an entity aggregates and then stores PPI, that entity has a duty to reasonably 
safeguard that data.241 Therefore, the court did not apply the ELD to bar the 
plaintiffs’ tort claims.242 
3. Third-Party Problem: When There Exists a Web of Contracts in Data 
Breach Litigation and the Economic Loss Doctrine Does Not Apply 
Finally, when confronted with the third-party problem in data breach liti-
gation, some courts have found that the PCI-DSS does not suffice to create the 
sufficient level of privity that would implicate the contracting parties para-
                                                                                                                           
 235 Id. at 1183–84 (explaining that the facts underlying defendants’ argument resembled typical 
PCI-DSS third-party problems in which some sort of contract would bar the tort claims of both parties 
due to the ELD). 
 236 Id. (elaborating that the plaintiffs did not have the contractual relationship common in most 
third-party cases). 
 237 Id. (quoting Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 
2018)). In In re Equifax, Inc., the district court noted that at the core of the reasoning behind the 
court’s ruling in Community Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Markets, Inc. was the fact that the parties 
were involved in a network of contracts. Id. (describing the Community Bank of Trenton court’s ruling 
as focused on the existence of a network of contracts); see also Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 
815 (holding that the network of contracts voluntarily entered into by the parties precluded tort liabil-
ity under the ELD). 
 238 Compare Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 815 (stating that the plaintiffs had legal remedies 
through the “web of contracts”), with In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1183–84 (describing the 
plaintiffs as having no pre-existing legal remedies available under contract law). 
 239 See In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1183–84 (“Thus, the Plaintiffs do not have the type 
of contractual remedies against the Defendants that the plaintiffs did against the retailer in Schnuck. 
Therefore, the Court finds Schnuck inapposite.”); see also Sharkey, supra note 18, at 352 (describing 
the stranger paradigm as one where the parties have no pre-existing contractual relationship or similar 
legal relationship). 
 240 See In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1172–73 (defining Georgia’s ELD as containing an 
independent duty exception). 
 241 See id. at 1171 (“It is well-established that entities that collect sensitive, private data from 
consumers and store that data on their networks have a duty to protect that information . . . .” (quoting 
Brush v. Mia. Beach Healthcare Grp. Ltd., 238 F. Supp. 3d 1359, 1365 (S.D. Fla. 2017))). 
 242 Id. (holding the ELD would not apply). The court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss. 
Id. at 1185. 
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digm.243 In these cases, the courts determined that the entanglement of con-
tracts that constitute the PCI-DSS does not foreclose recovery, as a non-
contractual independent duty exists between the parties.244 In doing so, these 
courts adopted a stranger paradigm and, as a result, generally held that the 
ELD does not apply to the plaintiff’s tort claims. 245 
For example, in 2018, in In re Arby’s Restaurant Group Inc. Litigation, 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia allowed the plain-
tiffs to move forward with their negligence claim against the defendant, due to 
the independent duty exception.246 Arby’s involved two groups of plaintiffs: 
customers of the defendant’s restaurants and issuing banks involved in the 
PCI-DSS system.247 The court held that the ELD would bar neither plaintiff 
classes’ negligence claims because no contract governed the rights and duties 
between the respective parties—an implicit adoption of the stranger para-
digm.248 For the plaintiffs that were issuing banks, the court expressly found no 
contractual relationship, despite the fact that both parties agreed to adhere to 
the PCI-DSS.249 Furthermore, the court found that the only contract that exist-
ed between customer plaintiffs and the defendant, Arby’s, stemmed out of the 
purchase of food that “does not address any allocation of risk or relevant con-
tractual obligation or restriction.”250 This duty existed independent of any con-
tractual obligation; therefore, the court held that Georgia’s ELD permitted an 
independent duty exception.251 
                                                                                                                           
 243 See, e.g., In re Arby’s Rest. Grp. Inc. Litig., C.A. No. 17-cv-0514, 2018 WL 2128441, at *12–
14 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018) (holding that the ELD did not bar the plaintiffs’ tort claims in the third-
party problem involving the PCI-DSS). 
 244 See, e.g., id.; see also Sharkey, supra note 18, at 371 (describing the misapplication of the 
stranger paradigm). 
 245 See In re Arby’s Rest. Grp., 2018 WL 2128441, at *12–14 (holding that the ELD does not bar 
claims for purely economic damages because no independent duty exception exists within the North-
ern District of Georgia). 
 246 See id. (refusing to apply the ELD, and reasoning that the defendant owed the plaintiffs an 
independent duty to reasonably secure PII). In 2018, In re Arby’s Restaurant Group Inc. Litigation, 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia observed that the plaintiffs were both 
consumers of the defendant’s restaurant and issuing banks who had to indemnify customers for the 
data breach. Id. at *1. The defendant was a restaurant chain that operated over 950 facilities national-
ly. Id. Hackers gained access to the defendant’s servers for seventy-three days and harvested the credit 
card information of millions of customers. Id. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant was aware 
vulnerabilities in their systems but took no steps to secure them. Id. 
 247 Id. at *1. 
 248 See id. at *12–14 (holding that neither group of plaintiffs were in a contractual relationship 
with the defendant as to preclude any tort liability). 
 249 Id. at *13 (“Arby’s has pointed to no provision of the Visa and MasterCard Rules that estab-
lish a contract between Plaintiffs as issuing banks and Arby’s as a merchant or acquirer.”). 
 250 Id. (defining the contractual relationship between the consumer and restaurant as not being 
broad enough to define data security duties). 
 251 Id. 
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III. RETHINKING THE ECONOMIC LOSS DOCTRINE IN THE INTERNET AGE: 
MATCHING POLICY WITH PRACTICE 
The ELD has been inconsistently applied in data breach litigation across 
jurisdictions; this has led to plaintiffs’ success depending on which geographic 
location they suffered the damage in rather than on the merits of their argu-
ments.252 A consistent, unified approach to the ELD will align and promote the 
established policy goals of tort and data breach litigation.253 Part III of this 
Note argues that the internet economy does not fit squarely under either the 
contracting parties or stranger paradigms and that plaintiffs whose PII was ex-
posed should be presumed to have a special relationship with the defendant 
who collected or processed their data, resulting in an exception to the ELD 
bar.254 Section A reasons that the traditional policy rationales underlying the 
ELD do not apply to data breach litigation as internet transactions do not in-
volve private ordering and potential plaintiffs are foreseeable.255 Section B ar-
gues that all data breach litigation should be considered within the contracting 
parties paradigm, as the transference of PII to a data controller or processor 
involves a contract.256 Section C explains why a special relationship test, as 
opposed to complete ELD bar to tort liability, best matches policy with prac-
tice and promotes cybersecurity investment.257 
A. Policy and Practice: How the Economic Loss Doctrine’s Policy Goals 
Do Not Apply to Data Breach Litigation 
Two overarching policy goals spurred the widespread adoption of the 
ELD: (1) promotion of private ordering and (2) protection from unforeseeable 
and unlimited liability. 258 Such fears—although highly relevant in the context 
                                                                                                                           
 252 Compare Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(applying the contracting parties paradigm, and barring the tort claims of the plaintiffs in data breach 
litigation surrounding the PCI-DSS), and Sovereign Bank v. BJ’s Wholesale Club, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 
2d 183, 203–04 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (same), aff’d, 533 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2008), with In re Arby’s Rest. 
Grp., 2018 WL 2128441, at *12–14 (holding that the plaintiffs’ tort claims were not barred by the 
ELD in data breach litigation involving the PCI-DSS). See generally Sharkey, supra note 18 (describ-
ing all the different ways courts apply the ELD in data breach litigation). 
 253 See Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1019–34 (describing the policy goals that underlie the ELD). 
See generally Dobbs, supra note 20, at 713–17 (explaining the numerous justifications for the ELD in 
the contracting parties and stranger paradigms); Fienman, supra note 48, at 814 (discussing the ELD 
and its effects on private ordering). 
 254 See infra notes 258–330 and accompanying text. 
 255 See infra notes 258–290 and accompanying text. 
 256 See infra notes 291–299 and accompanying text. 
 257 See infra notes 300–330 and accompanying text. 
 258 See 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 
(N.Y. 2001) (fearing that an extension of liability would unleash a chain of liability to all parties who 
have suffered small harms); Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (justifying the stranger and contracting 
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of a negligent truck driver or construction company—are unfounded in the 
context of data breach litigation.259 Data breach litigation currently centers on 
procedural hurdles, so evolving the ELD doctrine would allow lawsuits to fo-
cus on the adequacy of the cybersecurity security standards, promoting mean-
ingful consumer protection.260 
Firstly, unlike in traditional applications of the ELD, in data breach litiga-
tion the defendant data collector or processor can foresee a quantifiable class 
of potential plaintiffs with vulnerable data.261 By its very nature, PII can be 
linked to an individual.262 The plaintiff is no stranger to the defendant—
instead, the plaintiff often is a central part of the business model of the data 
controller or processor.263 For instance, social media companies’ business 
models depend on their processing of PII to sell to advertisers for individualized 
targeted marketing.264 Social media companies that collect PII do not aggregate 
PII but rather keep it deliberately hyper-individualized to ensure that their adver-
tiser customers can effectively target specific demographics and individuals.265 
Unlike in product liability litigation, the defendant in data breach litigation 
                                                                                                                           
parties paradigms); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1022–29 (explaining policy goals in the stranger and 
contracting parties paradigms). 
 259 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 713 (illustrating an example of the stranger rule). Compare In re 
Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1157, 1172 (N.D. Ga. 2019) 
(stating that the plaintiffs were a quantifiable group of financial institutions who had used the services 
of the key defendant, a credit reporting company), with 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 750 
N.E.2d at 1103 (noting that the class of plaintiffs would be unknowable and stretch beyond human 
foreseeability). 
 260 See Operdeck, supra note 128, at 981 (noting that the ELD and other procedural aspects result 
in little to no litigation challenging cybersecurity system reasonableness); Sales, supra note 1, at 
1535–38 (arguing for civil liability to promote reasonable cybersecurity standards). 
 261 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 2 (showing the prevalence of data breaches 
in the modern era); Caban, supra note 12 (describing how common data breaches are in the healthcare 
industry); Wagner, supra note 7 (explaining how companies use PII to specifically create advertise-
ment profiles for particular users and how they keep that data on a quantifiable group of individuals). 
 262 See Memorandum from Meglio III, Deputy Dir. for Mgmt., Off. of Mgmt. & Budget on Safe-
guarding Against and Responding to the Breach of Personally Identifiable Information to the Heads of 
Executive Departments and Agencies, supra note 4, at 1 n.1 (explaining that PII is data that can be 
linked to a specific individual). 
 263 See Short & Todd, supra note 10, at 17 (explaining how PII has been considered one of the 
most valuable assets for companies undergoing sales, mergers, or bankruptcies); Brynjolfsson & 
McAfee, supra note 5 (describing how companies have incorporated the use of data into their business 
models); Wagner, supra note 7 (explaining how social media websites rely on the aggregation of PII 
to sell to advertisers). 
 264 See Wagner, supra note 7 (describing the business model of social media companies). 
 265 See id. (explaining generally the business model of social media companies); see also A Deep 
Dive into Facebook Ads: How to Create, Optimize, and Test Facebook Ads, NEIL PATEL, https://
neilpatel.com/blog/deep-dive-facebook-advertising/ [https://perma.cc/FL2G-55YW]. Facebook gives 
advertisers exceptionally powerful tools to target certain demographics. A Deep Dive into Facebook 
Ads: How to Create, Optimize, and Test Facebook Ads, supra. An advertiser can target specific age 
groups, locations, genders, interests, connections, relationship statuses, languages, educations, and 
even workplaces. Id. This precision targeting increases an advertisement’s effectiveness. Id. 
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does not open a Pandora’s box of unlimited liability because only a quantifia-
ble and identifiable class of plaintiffs will be subject to their alleged negli-
gence.266 Further, a data controller or processor can foresee the likelihood of 
the harm occurring from a breach.267 The growing frequency of data breaches 
removes the unpredictability of the harm.268 In a traditional tort setting, such as 
in the 2001 case 532 Madison Avenue Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Cen-
ter, Inc., it stretched the boundaries of foreseeability for a construction compa-
ny to be able to predict that, as a result of their negligent actions, a local deli 
would see decreased foot traffic.269 In data breach litigation, however, compa-
nies are not only aware of the specific risk but actively take steps to prevent it. 
270 By simply requiring passwords, a company acknowledges that there are 
actors who seek to breach their systems; furthermore, investments in cyberse-
curity can immediately and effectively mitigate these risks.271 
Lastly, the ELD attempts to promote and respect contracts between private 
parties.272 Generally, private ordering posits that it is most economically efficient 
for private parties to allocate risks and duties through a contract; therefore, any 
imposition of additional tort liability would be unnecessary and inefficient.273 
This theory simply does not hold up in most data breach litigation cases, as the 
fundamental assumption of private ordering is that parties negotiate for an ac-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See, e.g., In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 
475–76 (D. Md. 2020) (distinguishing product liability litigation from the facts typically surrounding 
data breach litigation). 
 267 See In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019) (declaring that the risk of a data breach is foreseeable to a data controller or processor); 
IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 2 (describing the prevalence of data breaches across 
industries); Caban, supra note 12 (noting the increase in data breaches in the healthcare industry). 
 268 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 2 (discussing the rise in data breaches); 
Caban, supra note 12 (discussing the prevalence and frequency of data breaches in the healthcare 
industry). 
 269 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 
2001) (arguing that the type of damage suffered and the plaintiffs would be unforeseeable to the de-
fendant). 
 270 See, e.g., NASDAQ, supra note 126, at 5 (describing cybersecurity investment and the steps that 
companies have taken to prevent data breaches). 
 271 See BISSELL ET AL., supra note 126, at 16–18 (noting how higher investments in cybersecurity 
correlate with a decreased threat of a breach); CyberAvengers, Why Computer Passwords Are Still a 
Problem in 2019, NEXTGOV (Jan. 11, 2019), https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2019/01/why-
computer-passwords-are-still-problem-2019/154086/ [https://perma.cc/JRY2-PGTY] (noting that 
passwords are the foundation of most cybersecurity systems). 
 272 Johnson, supra note 40, at 546–47 (describing the ELD as an attempt to promote private or-
dering); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1033 (relaying the policy goals of the ELD in the contracting par-
ties paradigm). 
 273 Johnson, supra note 40, at 546–47 (arguing that ELD seeks to promote private ordering and 
parties allocating risk and rights through contract); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1033 (explaining the 
policy goals of encouraging contracts). 
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ceptable contract, which is not applicable in this context.274 Many of the contrac-
tual relationships that are common in data breach litigation involve “take it or 
leave it”275 contracts.276 A take-it-or-leave-it contract has standardized language 
and is offered as-is to all consumers as part of the terms of using a service.277 
Realistically, the individual does not possess the bargaining power to impose 
their interests effectively against data controllers or processors.278 Collective 
action would be the only viable route for consumers to negotiate effectively; 
however, that is inefficient because the size of the class of individuals involved 
in the market would impose momentous transaction costs to doing business.279 
Further, it is fundamentally unrealistic to expect hundreds of millions of individ-
uals to organize on the scale needed to effectively negotiate.280 The ubiquity of 
                                                                                                                           
 274 See Vincent R. Johnson, Credit-Monitoring Damages in Cybersecurity Tort Litigation, 19 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 113, 123–24 (2011) (“Consequently, the duties at issue in cybersecurity cases 
are, in large measure, not a proper subject for private ordering.”). Data breach plaintiffs often pursue 
damages to recoup the cost of credit monitoring. Id. Many state statutes preclude the ability to waive 
rights related to PII. Id. at 123 n.60. In turn, this inhibits individuals’ ability of the to engage in bar-
gaining for a contract effectively. Id. 
 275 What Is a Take It or Leave It Contract?, UPCOUNSEL, https://www.upcounsel.com/take-it-or-
leave-it-contract [https://perma.cc/Q8CJ-TZF7]. Sometimes called a contract of adhesion, a take-it-or-
leave-it contract is one that does not allow the customer to bargain for the terms. Id. 
 276 See In re Marriott Int’l, Inc., Costumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 453–55 
(D. Md. 2020) (conditioning customers’ ability to buy hotel rooms on assent to the terms of service 
regarding usage of their data); Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, *17–
22 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (conditioning employment on turning over PII); In re Sony Gaming 
Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 942, 945 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (condition-
ing users’ access to a gaming network on turning over PII). 
 277 See generally MAYA WILEY ET AL., THE NEW SCH., TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT: HOW NYC RESI-
DENTS ARE FORCED TO SACRIFICE ONLINE PRIVACY FOR INTERNET SERVICES (2018), http://bmgxb.
site/digital-equity-lab/take-it-or-leave-it.pdf [https://perma.cc/65H3-F6FJ] (describing how residents 
in NYC are given take-it-or-leave-it contracts with internet service providers, and identifying the 
associated privacy risks). For example, when an individual consumer approaches an Internet Service 
Provider to sign up, they are presented with a generic non-negotiable contract that mandates that, in 
exchange for internet access, the customer will provide consideration in the form of money and their 
own PII, arguably the latter being more valuable than the former. See generally id. (describing take-it-
or-leave-it contracts in New York City’s internet service industry). 
 278 See, e.g., Sales, supra note 1, at 1536–37 (arguing that most contracts in the digital sectors of 
the economy are forced upon consumers, and that bargaining would be nearly impossible due to the 
sheer number of people involved and the misalignment of all their incentives). 
 279 See Johnson, supra note 274, at 123 n.60 (“Moreover, it is simply unrealistic to expect that 
bargaining to occur between individual consumers and the large corporations that play a pervasive 
role in modem life.” (quoting Vincent R. Johnson, Cybersecurity, Identity Theft, and the Limits of Tort 
Liability, 57 S.C. L. REV. 255, 300 (2005))); Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (“It would be prohibitively 
expensive, if not impossible, for companies to bargain with everyone who conceivably could be in-
jured by cyber-attacks on their systems or products.”). 
 280 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (illustrating the barriers to collective bargaining in contracts 
involving cybersecurity). 
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data collection would extrapolate the transaction costs of bargaining for cyberse-
curity across industries.281 
More generally, policy considerations surrounding data breach litigation 
should encourage the removal of procedural hurdles.282 Private civil liability 
has the potential to promote both reasonable cybersecurity systems and ade-
quate cybersecurity investments.283 Costly litigation over the application of the 
ELD, however, disincentivizes or bars parties from fully litigating the facts 
regarding the adequacy of cybersecurity systems; instead, it promotes settle-
ment.284 Litigation over what reasonable cybersecurity systems entail could 
spur effective private regulation in the absence of government action.285 Addi-
tionally, imposing liability on negligent data controllers and processors would 
be socially optimal because it would promote investment in cybersecurity and 
attach liability to the least cost avoider, further promoting cybersecurity in-
vestment.286 The data controller or processer is the party most able to prevent a 
PII data breach; therefore, they should be most liable when one occurs.287 This 
is in juxtaposition to the current approach that imposes greater liability on pas-
sive parties in the system.288 Consider the Home Depot data breach: greater 
                                                                                                                           
 281 See IDENTITY THEFT RES. CTR., supra note 12, at 2 (exploring data breaches across industries 
showing how many sectors of the economy collect PII); Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (arguing that 
transaction costs are high to bargain for cybersecurity measures); Caban, supra note 12 (showing the 
amount of PII collected in the healthcare industry). Importantly, there are seven social media websites 
with over 250 million users. Priit Kallas, Top 15 Most Popular Social Networking Sites and Apps 
[2021], DREAMGROW, https://www.dreamgrow.com/top-15-most-popular-social-networking-sites/ 
[https://perma.cc/L3QY-AKSS] (Jan. 4, 2021). The costs of bargaining for cybersecurity standards or 
rights and remedies for data breaches would be impossibly high. Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (arguing 
that the size of the classes involved raise transaction costs to an extremely high measure). 
 282 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (advocating for civil liability); Dean, supra note 126 (ar-
guing that liability removes negative externalities in the market). 
 283 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (noting that liability would encourage investment in cy-
bersecurity); Vagle, supra note 124, at 86 (same); Dean, supra note 126 (same). 
 284 See Paula Hannaford-Agor, Measuring the Cost of Civil Litigation: Findings from a Survey of 
Trial Lawyers, VOIR DIRE, Spring 2013, at 22, 23 (noting that procedural hurdles drive up the costs of 
litigation); Inglis et al., supra note 158, at 91 (observing that increased court costs directly correlate 
with settlements). 
 285 See Stephen Shavell, Liability for Harm Versus Regulation of Safety, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 357, 
358–64 (1984) (describing that liability can amount to private regulation). See generally Alan Charles 
Raul et al., United States, in THE PRIVACY, DATA PROTECTION AND CYBERSECURITY LAW REVIEW 
399–422 (Alan Charles Raul ed., 6th ed. 2019) (detailing the dearth of government regulation of cy-
bersecurity). 
 286 See, e.g., BISSELL ET AL., supra note 126, at 16–18 (illustrating that investment and focus in 
cybersecurity does pay off); Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1033 (describing why attachment of liability to 
the cheapest cost avoider is advantageous); Paul Rosenzweig, Cybersecurity and the Least Cost 
Avoider, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.lawfareblog.com/cybersecurity-and-least-cost-
avoider [https://perma.cc/9JQT-GBGW] (describing generally that data controllers and processors are 
in the best position to secure their systems from hackers). 
 287 See Rosenzweig, supra note 286 (noting that data controllers and processors can most easily 
secure data storage systems and are also the least cost avoiders). 
 288 See id. (noting that liability generally has not fallen on the least cost avoider). 
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liability fell onto federal credit unions because they were tasked with reissuing 
credit cards and indemnifying fraudulent transactions, as compared to Home 
Depot which stored and collected the underlying exposed PII.289 Imposition of 
liability on data controllers or processors would create incentives to adequately 
secure PII and increase the potential return on their investment.290 
B. Dismantling the Paradigm in Data Breach Litigation:  
There Are No Strangers Here 
Courts’ inconsistent adoption of ELD paradigms, as opposed to a uniform 
application, stems from the novelty of the relationship between the individual 
data sources and the parties collecting and storing data in data breach litiga-
tion.291 The relinquishment of PII by data subjects is almost always a function 
of a transaction between two parties.292 At some point, a data controller or pro-
cessor has direct contractual privity with the individual whose PII is now the 
subject of litigation.293 As one court put it, the parties are not “ships passing 
. . . in the night.”294 Courts that have adopted the stranger paradigm in data 
breach litigation are often trying to fit incompatible realties in a doctrinal box, 
as the nature of the internet economy means that there are no perfect strangers 
in data breach litigation.295 Although the degree of separation may render the 
parties effectively strangers, an entanglement of contracts still exists.296 Instead 
                                                                                                                           
 289 See Dean, supra note 126 (describing the fallout from the Home Depot data breach and identi-
fying the parties that had the greatest financial burden). 
 290 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (noting that liability would increase investment in cyber-
security); Vagle, supra note 124, at 86 (explaining that liability encourages investment); Blau, supra 
note 129 (explaining that the return on investment in cybersecurity is often low for corporate execu-
tives); Dean, supra note 126 (arguing that liability defeats the moral hazard). 
 291 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 807 (7th Cir. 2018) (ex-
plaining the network of contracts involved in the PCI-DSS); Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. 
Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 851 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (elaborating on cybersecurity con-
tracts); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–67 (noting that the relationship of parties in data breach litiga-
tion has resulted in diverging choices of paradigms); Meglio, supra note 17, at 1242 (describing how 
some states have laws that require data processors to clearly disclose privacy policies to consumers). 
 292 See Meglio, supra note 17, at 1241 (explaining that contracts generally govern the relationship 
between data subjects and data controllers or processors). 
 293 See, e.g., In re Arby’s Rest. Grp. Inc. Litig., C.A. No. 17-cv-0514, 2018 WL 2128441, at *12–
14 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 5, 2018) (exploring how the PII exposed belonged to consumers who were in direct 
contractual privity with the defendant). 
 294 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 815 (distinguishing the relationship between parties in 
data breach litigation from conventional applications of torts); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 365–67 
(explaining that when a “web of contracts” exists, the contracting parties paradigm should apply); 
Meglio, supra note 17, at 1241 (noting that private contracts typically govern PII storage and collec-
tion). 
 295 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–78 (arguing that courts are often misapplying the stranger 
paradigm when clearly the contracting parties paradigm has been implemented). 
 296 See, e.g., In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 
(N.D. Ga. 2019) (holding there was not the contractual web implicated by the PCI-DSS). In 2019, in 
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of an ad-hoc approach, where courts must determine the significance of the 
parties’ separation, all data breach litigation should be presumed to fall under 
the contracting parties paradigm.297 This approach addresses the inconsistency 
of ELD application, expediates courts’ analysis, and reflects the facts of the 
internet economy.298 Accordingly, the special relationship test should be the 
only determinative factor as to whether the ELD applies to data breach law-
suits.299 
C. The Special Relationship Test: How It Should Be Applied  
in Data Breach Litigation 
In data breach litigation, the special relationship test, taken together with 
the policy goals of the ELD, should create a presumption that the ELD does 
not apply.300 When an individual gives over their PII, a contract typically exists 
with the data controller of processor that will govern the storage and collection 
of that PII.301 On the one hand, a per se non-application of the ELD in data 
breach litigation would dissolve the line between tort and contract and parties, 
no matter how sophisticated, would be discouraged from contracting with an-
other.302 On the other hand, a flat bar would prejudice plaintiffs who cannot 
engage in private ordering and are bound by a take-it-or-leave-it contract.303 
By adopting a presumption against ELD application, both of these valid com-
                                                                                                                           
In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Northern 
District of Georgia adopted the stranger paradigm due to the separation between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants; however, in reality all parties were bound in a network of contracts. See id.; BD. OF GOV-
ERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., CONSUMER’S GUIDE: CREDIT REPORTS AND CREDIT SCORES 1211, 
https://www.federalreserve.gov/creditreports/pdf/credit_reports_scores_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKA5-
EEL9] (noting that credit reporting agencies collect PII from banks and lenders). 
 297 See Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–67 (describing the contracting parties paradigm as one 
where a contract governs relationships); Meglio, supra note 17, at 1241 (stating that contracts general-
ly govern relationships between data subjects and controllers). 
 298 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 813–15 (discussing at great length which paradigm to 
adopt); Sharkey, supra note 18, at 366–78 (explaining how often courts have to decide which para-
digm to choose). 
 299 See Portier v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (D. Mass. Dec. 
31, 2019) (applying the special relationship test within the contracting parties paradigm); Sharkey, supra 
note 18, at 374 (noting how some courts apply a special relationship exception in the contracting par-
ties paradigm). 
 300 See Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (explaining that liability encourages investment); Vagle, 
supra note 124, at 86 (advocating for civil liability); Meglio, supra note 17, at 1236 (noting the lack of 
litigation over reasonableness); Dean, supra note 126 (arguing for liability). 
 301 See Meglio, supra note 17, at 1241 (explain how contracts govern relationships between data 
subjects and data controllers). 
 302 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 551–52 (discussing the “boundary-line” between tort and con-
tract law). 
 303 See id. (describing the ELD as upholding the border between tort and contract, and encourag-
ing bargaining through the restriction of tort liability); Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (describing the 
issues with private ordering in cybersecurity). 
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peting considerations are met: the ELD will still apply to bargained-for con-
tracts, protecting private ordering, while simultaneously consumer plaintiffs 
will be able to pursue tort liability related to take-it-or-leave-it contracts.304 
Although there are many incarnations of the special relationship test, in 
1979, in J’Aire Corp. v. Gregory, the Supreme Court of California established 
a six-factor test that best balances the competing goals of respecting contracts 
and simultaneously acknowledging the inherent imbalance of economic power 
between parties in most data breach litigation.305 The fifth and six J’Aire fac-
tors consider the general policy goals surrounding contract law and the specific 
policy concerns in the internet age, including private ordering, moral hazards, 
and the least cost avoider.306 The first three factors of the J’Aire test aim to fur-
ther the policy goals of preventing unlimited and unforeseeable liability.307 
When taken together, all six of the J’Aire factors allow courts to consider the 
ELD’s general policy goals, policy goals specific to the contracting parties 
paradigm, and to data breach litigation.308 
Furthermore, where defendants have an independent duty of care to rea-
sonably secure data, courts should presume that the test is satisfied.309 In 2018, 
in Dittman v. UPMC, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania articulated that when 
a data controller or processor undertakes efforts to gather data, that effort 
equates to an affirmative obligation.310 Under tort law, when an individual un-
dertakes an affirmative obligation—such as saving a car crash victim—there 
                                                                                                                           
 304 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 551 (noting that the ELD should apply to maintain boundary 
and promote contracting); Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (arguing for liability to encourage investment 
in cybersecurity and remedy market inefficiency). 
 305 See, e.g., 598 P.2d 60, 63 (Cal. 1979) (detailing a six-factor test that balances causation and 
damages with public policy goals of imposing liability and emphasizing the moral blame of the con-
duct). 
 306 See Johnson, supra note 40, at 546–47 (explaining that the ELD promotes private ordering); 
Sharkey, supra note 43, at 1033 (describing the policy goals in the contracting parties paradigm). 
 307 See Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (relaying policy goals of the stranger paradigm); Sharkey, 
supra note 43, at 1022–29 (describing the policy goals of the stranger paradigm). 
 308 See J’Aire Corp., 598 P.2d at 63 (including foreseeability into the six-factor test); 532 Madi-
son Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc. v. Finlandia Ctr., Inc., 750 N.E.2d 1097, 1103 (N.Y. 2001) (arguing 
that the ELD fends off unforeseeable damages); Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (describing the ELD 
protecting against unforeseeable damages). An inclusion of these factors prompts a court to consider 
more general ELD policy goals outside of the contracting parties paradigm’s specific policy goals. See 
J’Aire Corp., 598 P.2d at 63 (considering other factors); 532 Madison Ave. Gourmet Foods, Inc., 750 
N.E.2d at 1103 (discussing the general policy goals); Dobbs, supra note 20, at 715 (explaining the 
broader policy goals). 
 309 See In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d 1150, 1172 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019) (holding that there exists an independent duty to reasonably secure data); Dittman v. 
UPMC, 196 A.3d 1036, 1040 (Pa. 2018) (same). 
 310 See 196 A.3d at 1041 (stating that the defendant had taken affirmative steps by collecting the 
data which under conventional tort law would amount to the creation of a legal duty owed between the 
parties). 
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then arises a duty from that action.311 By taking on an affirmative obligation in 
storing the data, the data controller or processor takes on the risk of future 
harm.312 Through this basic principle of tort law, when a data controller or pro-
cessor voluntarily aggregates data, thus creating the risk of a data breach, they 
then owe the individual whose PII they collected a duty to reasonably secure 
that data.313 This is further supported by the foreseeability of data breach risks 
and the reality that accessible precautions can be taken to reduce those risks.314 
Due to the prevalence of data breaches, data controllers and processors can 
reasonably foresee the risk of hacks, making it is fair to expect them to take 
steps to reduce that risk.315 For instance, in 2019, In re Equifax, Inc., Customer 
Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Georgia explained that the defendants were cognizant of the risk of a 
data breach and could have taken preventive measures to mitigate that risk.316 
The original contract may supplant this established duty of care through the 
standards set in its provisions; however, a presumption that the plaintiffs have 
                                                                                                                           
 311 See id. (comparing the defendant’s actions of collecting the data to tort doctrines that will 
impose a duty of care for individuals who take affirmative acts). 
 312 See id. (noting that the act of collecting the data created the risk of a data breach in the first 
place and furthermore created a duty to reasonable protect that data). 
 313 See id. (noting that a party that voluntarily stores data takes on an affirmative obligation). 
 314 See In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (stating that the defendants should have been 
aware that a data breach was a foreseeable occurrence); see also Hapka v. Carecentrix, Inc., No. 16-
cv-02372, 2016 WL 7336407, at *5 (D. Kan. Dec. 19, 2016) (stating that when a risk is foreseeable, 
the defendants have a duty to reasonably protect against that harm). 
 315 See In re Equifax, Inc., 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (stating data controllers and processors can 
foresee breach risks); Fisher, supra note 17, at 230–31 (reasoning that defendants’ knowledge and 
capacity to defend against a type of attack should result in a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent 
that type of data breach from occurring). A full exploration of the reasonableness of the data security 
is beyond the scope of this Note. See Fisher, supra note 17, at 230–34 (defining the standard). See 
generally JIM HARVEY ET AL., ALSTON & BIRD, THE CCPA COULD RESET DATA BREACH LITIGA-
TION RISKS (2019), https://www.alston.com/-/media/files/insights/publications/2019/08/the-ccpa-
could-reset-data-breach-litigation-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/RTC5-AWHP] (describing how Califor-
nia and Illinois define reasonableness). Generally, however, the “risk/utility” approach establishes 
exceptions. Rick Lazio, Opinion, Cybersecurity Risk: What Does a ‘Reasonable’ Posture Entail and 
Who Says So?, CIO DIVE (July 22, 2019), https://www.ciodive.com/news/cybersecurity-risk-what-
does-a-reasonable-posture-entail-and-who-says-so/559207/ [https://perma.cc/8RLH-FQL3]. The ap-
proach balances the costs of implementing cybersecurity measures against the harm caused if the data 
were exposed. Id. Under this approach, the reasonableness standard would be more fact specific, set-
ting different standards for an entity storing solely email addresses from an entity storing social secu-
rity numbers. Id. 
 316 See 371 F. Supp. 3d at 1172 (stating that when a risk is foreseeable and steps can be taken to 
prevent such a risk, then the defendant should be liable for a breach of duty if they fail to take such 
steps); see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, The Tort of Negligent Enablement of Cyber-
crime, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1553, 1557–59 (2005) (arguing that data controllers and processors 
owe plaintiffs a duty of care for foreseeable cybersecurity intrusions). Some scholars have argued for 
a whole new negligence tort dubbed “negligent enablement of cybercrimes.” See Rustad & Koenig, 
supra, at 1557–59. 
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satisfied the special relationship test reflects the reality of this affirmative obli-
gation duty.317 
In determining whether a special relationship does apply, the J’Aire test, 
particularly its moral blame and deterrence factors, gives considerable weight 
to the type of contract at issue.318 Data breach litigation typically involves two 
types of contracts: a take-it-or-leave-it contract, as seen in the 2020 case In re 
Marriott International, Inc., Costumer Data Security Breach Litigation and the 
2019 case Portier v. NEO Technology Solutions, or a bargained-for contract, as 
seen in the 2016 case Silverpop Systems, Inc. v. Leading Market Technologies, 
Inc.319 When the parties bargain for a contract, the fifth and sixth factors 
should not be satisfied, and thus the ELD should bar claims beyond the scope 
of contractual rights and duties.320 If the contract is take-it-or-leave-it, howev-
er, under most circumstances a special relationship exception should apply.321 
Imposition of civil liability will promote adequate cybersecurity standards and 
combat the negative externalities inherent in the internet economy.322 Addi-
tionally, because the defendant has a common law duty to reasonably secure 
personal data, the J’Aire test should place significant weight on the moral 
blame attached to their conduct.323 
                                                                                                                           
 317 See Silverpop Sys., Inc. v. Leading Mkt. Techs., Inc., 641 F. App’x 849, 850–51 (11th Cir. 
2016) (per curiam) (holding that there does exist an independent duty, but noting that the contract’s 
enumeration of data security standards supplanted that duty). 
 318 See, e.g., In re Sony Gaming Networks & Consumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 996 F. Supp. 2d 
942, 945 (S.D. Cal. 2014) (discussing moral blame and policy goals in reference to the type of con-
tract between the parties); Sales, supra note 1, at 1520 (noting that in traditional cybersecurity, the 
lack of liability encourages less cybersecurity and more future harm); Dean, supra note 126 (arguing 
for the policy goal of increasing liability where a moral hazard exists because the third-party cannot 
bargain for the contract). 
 319 Compare Silverpop Sys., Inc., 641 F. App’x at 850–51 (noting that the case involved two enti-
ties entering a business relationship with bargained-for rights and remedies), with In re Marriott Int’l, 
Inc., Costumer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 440 F. Supp. 3d 447, 475–76 (D. Md. 2020) (requiring con-
sumers to agree to the contract in order to purchase a hotel room or other hotel services), and Portier 
v. NEO Tech. Sols., No. 17-cv-30111, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (D. Mass. Dec. 31, 2019) (man-
dating that employees turn over PII for employment). 
 320 Silverpop Sys., Inc., 641 F. App’x at 850–51 (holding that the ELD applied because the parties 
had bargained for their rights and remedies, and therefore their contract supplied any duties). 
 321 See Portier, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (mandating employees turn over PII to gain em-
ployment); see also In re Sony Gaming Networks, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 945. In 2014, in In re Sony Gam-
ing Networks & Consumer Data Security Breach Litigation, the U.S. District Court for the Southern 
District of California concluded that the policy prong of the J’Aire test had been met; however, due to 
the abstract nature of the plaintiffs’ damage, the court concluded that the special relationship test had 
failed. 996 F. Supp. 2d at 945. 
 322 See Operdeck, supra note 128, at 959 (arguing for civil liability in data breach litigation to 
promote cybersecurity investment); Sales, supra note 1, at 1535–38 (same); Vagle, supra note 124, at 
86 (same); Dean, supra note 126 (same). 
 323 See Portier, 2019 WL 7946103, at *17–22 (applying the test where there was a take-it-or-
leave-it contract to allow plaintiffs to proceed with tort claims). 
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The PCI-DSS system occupies a grey area between take-it-or-leave-it 
contracts and bargained-for contracts.324 Entry into the credit card payment 
network is contingent on adherence to the terms set by the PCI-DSS.325 The 
parties within the network, however, have negotiated and planned business 
decisions around the contractual damages, duties, and remedies that they 
agreed to within the PCI-DSS.326 The PCI-DSS enumeration of cybersecurity 
standards supplants the defendant’s independent duty of care to reasonably 
secure the data.327 Institutional and corporate plaintiffs do knowingly enter the 
web of contracts; therefore, generally the ELD should apply to data breach 
litigation involving the PCI-DSS.328 Imposition of liability would shock the 
PCI-DSS system and upset settled expectations that underlie significant busi-
ness decisions, despite the take-it-or-leave-it nature of the system at large.329 
Consumer plaintiffs’ only interaction with the system is retail purchases; thus, 
they should not have the ELD applied to their data breach litigation claims.330 
CONCLUSION 
Courts developed the Economic Loss Doctrine (ELD) upon venerable 
ideals; however, its principles are ill-suited to the modern economy. The ELD 
sought to promote the well-meaning policy goals of foreseeability and private 
ordering. Since its incarnation in the law, the ELD has remained a cornerstone 
                                                                                                                           
 324 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 815 (7th Cir. 2018) (noting 
that the PCI-DSS is an allocation of rights and duties between private parties); PCI SEC. STANDARDS 
COUNCIL, supra note 140, at 5 (describing that all parties in the credit card payment network are sub-
ject to the PCI-DSS). 
 325 See PCI SEC. STANDARDS COUNCIL, supra note 140, at 5 (noting that accessing the credit card 
payment network requires PCI-DSS compliance). 
 326 See Cmty. Bank of Trenton, 887 F.3d at 815 (holding that because the defendant already has to 
bear the cost of data security under the PCI-DSS reimbursement provisions, imposing greater liability 
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of tort law. The very same policy that inspired the ELD now dictates that it 
should have a diminished impact in data breach litigation. Plaintiffs and courts 
should no longer struggle with how and when to apply the ELD to tort claims 
for victims in data breach litigation. The adoption of the special relationship 
test will provide consistency in application and promote the litigation of the 
merit of the cases. Hopefully, the removal of procedural barriers will result in 
data breach litigation going to trial. This in turn will provide clarity to data 
controllers and processors as to what constitutes a reasonable cybersecurity 
system and will create liability for failure to reach the standard. These factors 
should result in fewer data breaches, fewer victims, and more security for per-
sonal identifiable information. 
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